Abstract
We discuss sensitivity of equilibrium points in bimatrix games depending on small variances (perturbations) of data. Applying implicit function theorem to a linear complementarity problem which is equivalent to the bimatrix game, we investigate sensitivity of equilibrium points with respect to the perturbation of parameters in the game. Namely, we provide the calculation of equilibrium points derivatives with respect to the parameters.
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