Conclusion
The debate between Jean-Pierre Changeux and Alain Connes is one of the most, interesting to take place in recent years. It re-frames in a very up-to-date context a whole series of traditional and difficult questions from the standpoint of the knowledge and experience of two of the leading protagonists of contemporary science. To the choice presented by the neurobiologist between a Platonist ontology and a neurocognitive psychology of mathematical activity, the mathematician replies with a conception that is objective (neither ontological nor psychological) of the thoroughly consistent universe of mathematical idealities. It is indeed in this three-sided arena that the major difficulties play themselves out. One of the great virtues of the book is to cast a spotlight on this confrontation.
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Petitot, J. Conversations on mind, matter, and mathematics. The Mathematical Intelligencer 27, 48–56 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02985861
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02985861