La spatialité originaire du corps propre

Phénoménologie et neurosciences

Résumé

La tradition phénoménologique s'oppose aux sciences cognitives contemporaines en ceci que le corps propre n'est pas, pour elle, une simple chose du monde physique dont l'esprit-cerveau contiendrait une représentation mentale, mais qu'il est plutôt constitué en son sens d'être pour le sujet par son usage et son appropriation active par ce même sujet, en tant qu'être agissant. Or, il existe une affinité, encore non reconnue, entre cette conception et celle qui ressort de la littérature en cartographie cérébrale des vingt dernières années, d'une neurodynamique morphogénétique fonctionnelle in duite et modulée par l'expérience, en une relative autonomie par rapport aux structures anatomiques du corps comme aux frontières cytoarchitectoniques du cerveau. Tirant parti de cette affinité, nous prenons appui sur les données des neurosciences pour réhabiliter contre sa dévalorisation par les sciences cognitives la théorie de la constitution de Husserl, en revenant de ses adaptations ultérieures (Merleau-Ponty) à sa forme authentique, qui est celle de l'auto-constitution subjective (transcendantale) du corps propre sur la base de l'expérience pratico-kinesthésique du «je meus mon corps».

Abstract

The phenomenological tradition stands opposed to contemp orary cognitive science in this, that so far from being a mere thing in the physical world, a thing whose mind would contain some mental representation, the lived body is constituted in its sense of being for the subject by being used and actively appropriated by this self-same subject, as agent. Though not already generally acknowledged, there are important similarities between this conception and one, which emerges from the literature of brain cartography over the last twenty years, that of a functional morphogenetic neurodynamics, induced and modulated by experience in a relatively autonomous way, in relation both to the anatomic structures of the body, as well as the cytoarchitectonic frontiers of brain tissue. Taking advantage of the latter similarities, neuroscientific data can be employed to confirm the Husserlian theory of constitution against the attempts on the part of cognitive science to discredit it, and this whether we are talking about its later modification at the hands of Merleau-Ponty or the original version, which is that of a subjective (transcendental) auto-constitution of the lived body on the basis of the practico-kinoesthetic experience of «I move my body».

Zusammenfassung

Die phänomenologische Tradition unterscheidet sich von der gegenwärtigen Kognitionswissenschaft dadurch, daß der Leib für sie kein einfacher Gegenstand der körperlichen Welt ist, dessen im Gehirn angesiedelter Geist eine mentale Darstellung enthält, sondern daß seine Bedeutung vielmehr darin besteht, daß er für das handelnde Subjekt existiert, indem er von diesem benutzt und aktiv angeeignet wird. Folglich besteht eine noch nicht erkannte Affinität zwischen dieser Konzeption und derjenigen, die aus der in den letzten zwanzig Jahren entstandenen Literatur zur Kartierung des Gehirns hervorgeht. Bei dieser handelt es sich um eine funktionale morphogenetische Neurodynamik, die durch die Erfahrung herausgebildet wurde, wobei der Geist eine gewisse Autonomie hinsichtlich der anatomischen Struktur und der durch den Aufbau der Zellen bedingten Grenzen des Gehirns gewinnt. Ausgehend von dieser Affinität stützen wir uns auf die Ergebnisse der Neurowissenschaft, um die Konstitutionstheorie von Husserl gegen ihre Entwertung durch die Kognitionswissenschaften zu verteidigen. Wir führen sie von ihren später erfolgten Anpassungen (Merleau-Ponty) auf ihre authentische Form zurück, die eine subjektive (transzendentale) Selbstdarstellung des Leibes auf der Grundlage der Erfahrungsgrundlage der Kinästhesie («Ich bewege meinen Körper») darstellt.

Riassunto

La tradizione fenomenologica si oppone alle scienze cognitive contemporanee in quanto dal suo punto di vista il corpo vivente non è una mera cosa all'interno del mondo fisico, una cosa il cui cervello contenga delle rappresentazioni mentali, ma è piuttosto costituito nel suo senso di «essere per il soggetto in base al suo uso« ed in base alla sua appropriazione attiva da parte dello stesso soggetto, in quanto agente. Esiste un'affinità, non ancora riconosciuta, tra questa concezione e quella che scaturisce dalla letteratura sulla cartografia cerebrale degli ultimi vent'anni, quella di una neurodinamica morfogenetica, indotta e modulata dall'esperienza in modo relativamente autonomo, in relazione sia alle strutture anatomiche del corpo, sia alle frontiere citoarchitettoniche del cervello. Prendendo spunto da questa affinità prendiamo in considerazione i dati delle neuroscienze per riabilitare, contro la svalutazione da parte delle scienze cognitive, la teoria della costituzione di Husserl, e ricostruiamo, indipendentemente dalle modificazioni successive (Merleau-Ponty), la versione originaria; questa è la teoria di una auto-costituzione soggettiva (trascendentale) del corpo vissuto sulla base dell' esperienza pratico-cinestetica del «io muovo il mio corpo».

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Correspondence to Jean-Luc Petit.

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Jean-LucPetit, né en 1944, est professeur de philosophie à l'université Marc-Bloch Strasbourg II, et en délégation CNRS depuis septembre 2000 au laboratoire de Physiologie de l'action et de la perception au Collège de France (Paris). Il est spécialiste de la philosophie de l'action, de la phénoménologie du corps et de la philosophie des neurosciences et des sciences cognitives.

À Alain Berthoz, Jean Petitot et Giuseppe Longo, je tiens à exprimer mes remerciements et mon amitié en considération de ce que je leur dois: au premier, de m'avoir fait comprendre le cerveau comme dynamisme; au deuzième, ce dynamisme comme morphogenèse; au troisième, ce dynamisme morphogénétique, comme à dé-réprimer d'urgence, en changeant le modèle représentationnel des sciences cognitives.

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Petit, J. La spatialité originaire du corps propre. Rev synth 124, 139–171 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02963403

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Mots-Clés

  • corps propre
  • corps physique
  • constitution
  • neuroplasticité fonctionnelle

Keywords

  • lived body
  • physical body
  • constitution
  • functional neuroplasticity

Stichwörter

  • Leib
  • physikalischer Körper
  • Konstitution
  • funktionale Neuroplastizität

Parole Chiave

  • corpo proprio
  • corpo fisico
  • costituzione
  • neuroplasticità funzionale