Abstract
Long-term growth in most developing countries is driven by the adaptation of technology from developed countries. The question, however, of how to promote technology adaptation is a difficult one. The following article introduces a transaction cost perspective and applies it to the concrete and—against the background of the 4th Ministerial Conference of the WTO in November 2001—topical question: how do WTO rules impact on development in terms of technology adaptation? This issue is of utmost importance to the EU, which put forward the argument that the new Trade Round had to become a “Development Round”.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Cf. K. Liebig: Geistige Eigentumsrechte: Motor oder Bremse wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung? DIE, Bonn 2001, p. 12.
The share of developing countries in global expenditure on R&D is only about 4 per cent. Cf. K. Kliebig, op. cit.,, p. 12.
Cf. R. E. Hall and C. I. Jones: Why do Some Countries Produce so Much More Output per Worker than Others?, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. CXIV 1999, p. 83.
Ibid., Cf. R. E. Hall and C. I. Jones: Why do Some Countries Produce so Much More Output per Worker than Others?, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. CXIV 1999, p. 92.
Cf. B. A. Lundvall: Innovation as an Interactive Process: from User-Producer Interaction to the National System of Innovation, in: G. Dosi et al. (eds.): Technical Change and Economic Theory, London and New York 1988, p. 350ff.
Cf. e.g. M. Bell: Technical Change in Infant Industries. A Review of Empirical Evidence, The World Bank, Washington D.C. 1986, p. 92.
Cf. ILO/UNCTC: Economic and Social Effects of Multinational Enterprises in Export Processing Zones, International Labour Office, Geneva 1998; M.-L. Egan and A. Mody: Buyer-Seller Links in Export Development, in: World Development, Vol. 20, No. 3, March 1992; B. A. Lundvall, op. cit., Innovation as an Interactive Process: from User-Producer Interaction to the National System of Innovation, in: G. Dosi et al. (eds.): Technical Change and Economic Theory, London and New York 1988, p. 350ff. E. v. Hippel: The Sources of Innovation, Oxford University Press, Oxford und New York 1988.
Cf. H. Pack: Endogenous Growth Theory: Intellectual Appeal and Empirical Shortcomings, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1994, p. 7; F. Stewart and E. Ghani: How Significant Are Externalities for Development?, in: World Development, Vol. 19, No. 6, 1991, p. 574f., and cited literature.
Cf. F. Malerba: Learning by Firms and Incremental Technical Change, in: The Economic Journal, Vol. 102, July 1992, p. 848.
Cf. W. J. Baumol: Indivisibilities, in: J. Eatwell, M. Lmilgate, P. Newman (eds.): The New Palgrave, Vol. 2, London 1987, on the concept of “sunk costs”.
Cf. A. Balmann et al.: Path-Dependence Without Increasing Returns to Scale and Network Externalities, in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 29, 1996, p. 161.
Cf. A. B. Atkinson and J. E. Stiglitz: A New View of Technological Change, in: Economic Journal, Vol. 79, September 1969.
Cf. Y. Barzel: Transaction Costs: Are They Just Costs?, in: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 141, No. 1, 1985, p. 10.
Cf. E. Terberger: Neo-institutionalistische Ansätze. Entstehung und Wandel—Anspruch und Wirklichkeit, unpublished manuscript, Wiesbaden 1992, p. 237 ff.
Ibid., Cf. E. Terberger: Neo-institutionalistische Ansätze. Entstehung und Wandel—Anspruch und Wirklichkeit, unpublished manuscript, Wiesbaden 1992, p. 246ff. For a fulle raccount cf. also R. B. Myerson and M. A. Satterthwaite: Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading, in: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 29, 1983; W. Samuelson: A Comment on the Coase Theorem, in: A. E. Roth (ed.), Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining, Cambridge 1985.
Cf. J. F. Nash: Two-Person Cooperative Games, in: Econometrica, Vol. 21, 1953; K. J. Arrow: The Property Rights Doctrine and Demand Revelation Under Incomplete Information, in: M. Boskin (ed.): Economics and Human Welfare, New York 1979.
Cf. E. Terberger, op. cit., Neo-institutionalistische Ansätze. Entstehung und Wandel—Anspruch und Wirklichkeit, unpublished manuscript, Wiesbaden 1992, p. 85.
Cf. J. Tirole: Collusion and the Theory of Organizations, in: J.-J. Laffont (ed.): Advances in economic Theory: Proceedings of the Sixth World Congress of the Econometric Society, Vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (MA) 1992; D. Aamoglu: Monitoring and Collusion, Mimeo, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1994, on the repeated transaction models.
Cf. D. C. North: Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge 1990, p. 13; Y. Barzel, op. cit., Transaction Costs: Are They Just Costs?, in: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 141, No. 1, 1985, p. 471.
Cf. C. J. Dahlman: The Problem of Externality, in: The Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, 1979, p. 146.
Cf. G. Bamberg and K. Spremann: Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives, Berlin 1989, p. 24.
Cf. O. E. Williamson: The Economics of Governance: Framework and Implications, in: Journal for Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Vol. 140, No. 1, 1984, p. 205.
Cf. O. E. Williamson: Transaction-Cost Economics: the Governance of Contractual Relations, in: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1979; O. E. williamson: A Comparison of Alternative Approaches to Economic Organization, in: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Vol. 146, 1990.
Cf. O. E. Williamson: Transaction-Cost Economics, … op. cit., governance of Contractual Relations, in: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1979, p. 237.
Cf. B. Klein, R. Crawford, A. Alchian: Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, in: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, 1978; E. Radner: Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting, in: Econometrica, Vol. 53, 1985.
On the question of state promotion of trilateral governance structures and networks cf. especially J. Humphrey and H. Schmitz: The Tripe C Approach to Local Industrial Policy, in: World Development, Vol. 24, No. 12, 1996; L. Nadvi: The Cutting Edge: Collective Efficiency and International Competitiveness in Pakistan, in: IDS Discussion Paper, Institute for Development Studies No. 360, 1997; H. Schmitz: Collective Efficiency: Growth Path for Small-Scale Industry, in: The Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4, 1995; J. Tendler and M. Amorim: Small Firms and their Helpers: Lessons in Demand, in: World Development, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1996.
The gragh is based on a diagram by A. Picot: Contingencies for the Emergence of Efficient Symbiotic Arrangements, in: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Vol. 149, No. 9, 1993, p. 733.
(Cf. O. E. Williamson: Transaction-Cost Economics …, op. cit.: the Governance of Contractual Relations, in: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1979; p. 245 f.)
Cf. W Elsner: Institutionen und ökonomische Institutionentheorie —Begriffe, Fragestellungen, theoriegeschichtliche Ansätze, in: Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium, Vol. 1, 1987.
Cf. J. K. Zattler: Endogenes Wachstum, Unsicherheit und Institutionen —wirtschaftspolitische Implikationen für Entwicklungsländer, University of Giessen 2000, p. 77ff.
For an in-depth discussion of the various impacts, see J. K. Zattler, op. cit. Endogenes Wachstum, Unsicherheit und Institutionen —wirtschaftspolitische Implikationen für Entwicklungsländer, University of Giessen 2000, p. 77ff. ch. 6–8.
Cf. D. Bhattasali, M. Jayawickrama, P. Harrold: Practical Lessons for Africa from East Asia in Industrial and Trade Policies, in: World Bank Discussion Papers, No. 310, 1996.
J. E. Stiglitz: Knowledge as a Global Public-Good, in: I. Kaul et al. (eds.): Global Public Goods—International Cooperation in the 21st Century, New York/Oxford 1999, p. 312.
See J. K. Zattler, op. cit., Endogenes Wachstum, Unsicherheit und Institutionen —wirtschaftspolitische Implikationen für Entwicklungsländer, University of Giessen 2000, p. 136ff.
See OECD: Trade and Development Issues in Non-OECD Countries—Tables and Appendices, Trade Directorate, Paris 2000, p. 10.
See World Bank: Leveraging Trade for Development, Background Paper to the Spring Meeting of the Development Committee, Washington 2001.
Cf. K. Liebig, op. cit. p. 30ff.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
The article expresses the author's personal opinion.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Zattler, J.K. Growth policies in developing countries. Intereconomics 37, 212–222 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02930215
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02930215