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Why does redistribution not shrink when equality is high?

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  • Income Distribution
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Intereconomics

Abstract

Studies on growth and distribution often claim that there is a positive relationship between the extent of inequality and the amount of redistribution. The following article presents empirical evidence for 15 high-income countries to show that even in economies with relatively high equality redistribution does not shrink, and offers a number of politico-economic explanations for this fact

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References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln, Cologne, Germany

    Michael Groemling

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This publication is part of the project “Equality versus Efficiency” supported by informedia-Stiftung—Gemeinnützige Stiftung für Gesellschaftswissenschaften und Publizistik, Cologne.

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Groemling, M. Why does redistribution not shrink when equality is high?. Intereconomics 37, 204–211 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02930214

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