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Avoiding excessive deficits with fiscal coordination light

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  1. Austrian Institute of Economic Research, Vienna, Austria

    Thomas Uril (Research staff member)

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  1. Thomas Uril
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Uril, T. Avoiding excessive deficits with fiscal coordination light. Intereconomics 36, 281–285 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02930144

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