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Intereconomics

, Volume 33, Issue 6, pp 251–259 | Cite as

Climate policy and interest Groups—A Public choice analysis

  • Axel Michaelowa
Climate Policy

Abstract

Climate policy is particularly prone to the activities of interest groups. How have these shaped the development of policy targets and instruments?

Keywords

Emission Reduction Climate Policy Kyoto Protocol Joint Implementation Voluntary Agreement 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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Copyright information

© HWWA and Springer-Verlag 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Axel Michaelowa
    • 1
  1. 1.Saint CloudFrance

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