Abstract
Although the Treaty of Amsterdam has not lived up to the expectations of those who wanted a substantially stronger and more active European Union, it has expanded considerably the competences of the Union. In some policy areas such as social policy, it has added significantly to the obligations of the member states. By implication, the policy discretion of member states has been reduced further. The reasonable question that arises is whether the Union will and whether it should keep encroaching on the policy discretion (some use the word sovereignty) of its member states? The aim of this paper is to provide an answer to that question with respect to the economic functions of member states.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
For a summary of the relevant literature see, for example, the special issue on national competitiveness of the. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Autumn 1996, Vol. 12, No. 3.
See M. Jovanovic: International Economic Integration, Routledge, London 1992.
See the classic analysis of market failure and transaction costs in R. Coase: The Problem of Social Cost, in: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 1 (1960), October.
See G. Majone: The European Community as a Regulatory State, discussion paper, European University Institute, 1994; and G. Majone: Regulating Europe, Routledge, London 1996.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
The author wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Les Metcalfe, Aad van Mourik and Bernard Steunenberg for comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper. The author alone is responsible for the views expressed in the paper, which are strictly personal.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Nicolaides, P. The role of member states as rule-makers in the European Union. Intereconomics 33, 3–10 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02929026
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02929026