Journal of Economics and Finance

, Volume 21, Issue 1, pp 43–49 | Cite as

The rise (or fall) of lottery adoption within the logic of collective action: Some empirical evidence

  • Franklin G. Mixon
  • Steven B. Caudill
  • Jon M. Ford
  • Ter Chao Peng


This paper builds upon previous work on the economics of lottery adoption by incorporating the collective action logic developed in an important series of works by Mancur Olson. Public choice research points out that legislators are rational maximizers, and act within a costbenefit framework in attempting to implement means of budget finance. Discrete-time hazard models presented suggest that lottery adoption is more likely to occur in older states where rent seeking groups are older and more organized, and can more effectively engage in efforts for collective action (and benefits). By implementing lotteries as taxshifting mechanisms, the role of, government and the direction of social evolution are also altered.


Collective Action Important Series Single Cross Section State Lottery Local Debt 
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Copyright information

© Springer 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Franklin G. Mixon
    • 1
  • Steven B. Caudill
    • 2
  • Jon M. Ford
    • 3
  • Ter Chao Peng
    • 4
  1. 1.Department of Economics and International BusinessUniversity of Southern MississippiHattiesburg
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsAuburn UniversityAuburn
  3. 3.Department of EconomicsUniversity of Texas at ArlingtonArlington
  4. 4.Department of EconomicsFeng Chia UniversityTaiwan

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