Abstract
The United Nations’ first development decade has not come up to expectations in Its results: neither did developing countries succeed in achieving a minimum growth rate of 5 p.c. of their GNP, nor did lndustriailsed nations use for aid the equivalent of I p.c. of their GNP. U Thant called this decade a decade of frustration.
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Press Releases of the Federal Ministry of Economic Coopera- tion (hereafter abbreviated as BMZ).
Cf. here and below: BMZ, Entwicklungspolitische Konzeption der Bundesrepublik Deutschland für die Zweite Entwicklungsdekade (Concept for Federal Republic of Germany’s Development Policy in the Second Development Decade), in: Bulletin of the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, Bonn, No. 25, Feb. 17, 1971, pp. 263 et seq.
UN, Internationale Strategie für das Zweite Entwicklungsjahrzehnt der Vereinten Nationen (International Development Strategy for the Second Development Decade of the United Nations), in the BMZ publication of the same title, Bonn, 1971, p. 7.
Cf. Jan T i n b e r g e n , Ein neues Konzept (A new Concept), in: Die Zeit, No. 19, May 7, 1971.
The Federal Republic made available DM 5 mn for the first time in 1969 to serve this purpose.
See Entwicklungspolitische Konzeption der Bundesrepublik Deutschland für die Zweite Entwicklungsdekade, (Development Policy Concept of the Federal Republic of Germany for the Second Development Decade), L.c., p. 267.
L.c., p. 264.
Peter Diebold, FAO-Leitplan — Wegweiser einer internationalen Agrarpolitik (The FAO’s General Plan — a Pointer towards an International Policy on Farming), in: WIRTSCHAFTSDIENST, 1968, Vol. 48, No. 6, pp. l341 et seq.
Almost all government departments bear responsibility for Development Aid, though in varying proportions.
See Klaus Leffringhausen, Regierungserklärungen zur Entwicklungspolitik werfen Fragen auf (Government Statements on Development Policy Have Posed Questions), in: Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit, 1971, No 5, p. 4.
That the CDU/CSU opposition will not pass by this chance unused, may be seen from the interviews of INTERECONOMICS with the Federal Minister, Dr Eppler, and the opposition spokesman on development policy, Leisler Kiep. Moreover, the opposition spokesman fears for the Federal Republic’s credibility in foreign countries, as follows: “Such promises made without solid financial planning must have a disconcerting effect on the developing countries… ” (from the interview on “Development Policy in the Conflict of Opinions”, in: INTERECONOMICS, 1971, No. 7, p. 201).
However, capital aid is to be reduced relatively to technical aid, in order to obtain a well-balanced proportion between capital transfers and the transfer of knowhow. For this reason, authorised expenditure on capital account for 1971 was increased by 9 p.c., whilst technical aid is to rise by 18 p.c.
Press releases of the Federal Ministry of Economics.
Estimates of BMZ up to the end of 1969 show that Germany’s share in new deposits with the World Bank was 5.5 p.c. of the total, but its share in drawings on account of goods supplied nearly 12 p.c. In account with IDA, the corresponding figures were 8.9 and 19.3 p.c., respectively. In account with the Second European Development Fund, new deposits for financing aid were 33 p.c. of the total, drawings for deliveries only 22.5 p.c. But compared with past developments, this was an improvement of the German position; cf. Karl-Heinz Sohn, Kooperation ist das Gebot der Stunde (Cooperation is Needed Now), in: Vorwärts, No. 6, Feb. 6, 1971.
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Fasbender, K. Critical Notes on German Development Strategy. Intereconomics 6, 249–252 (1971). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02927094
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02927094