Abstract
The debate about monetary integration within Europe often distracts attention from the Community's external relations.1 In the field of monetary and exchange rate policy, however, thought is being given to ways in which countries could co-operate more efficiently at the world level.2 How should these ideas be assessed, and what are their chances of success?
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References
Exceptions in this respect are P. Bofinger: European and International Economic Policy Cooperation—The Need for an Integrated Approach, contribution to a joint research project on “International Macroeconomic Policy Cooperation” by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Tokyo, the Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C., and the Hamburg-Institute for Economic Research (HWWA), Hamburg, September 1989; and E. Thiel: Das EWS im internationalen Währungssystem—Eine Herausforderung für die USA? —Äußere Profilierung und innere Konvergenz, in: H.-E. Scharrer and W. Wessels (eds.): Das Europäische Währungssystem, Bonn 1983.
See J. Williamson and M. H. Miller: Targets and Indicators: A Blueprint for the International Coordination of Economic Policy, Washington, D.C., 1987; R. I. McKinnon: Currency Substitution and Instability in the World Dollar Standard, in: American Economic Review, Vol. 72, No. 3, June 1982.
On the first possibility, see R. Hasse: Die Europäische Zentralbank: Perspektiven für eine Weiterentwicklung des Europäischen Währungssystems, Gütersloh 1989. On the second alternative of finding a more evenly balanced means of arriving at consensus, see also H.-E. Scharrer: Eine Zentralbank für Europa?, in: Integration, July 1988, pp. 97 f.
See for example W. Filc: Europäische Geldpolitik nach 1990, paper for the symposium “Europäische Zentralbank—Europäische Währungspolitik im Wandel” held from 12th to 14th October 1989 at the Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Trier 1989.
Club theory dates back to the works of Buchanan and Olson. See J.M. Buchanan: An Economic Theory of Clubs, in: Economica, Vol. 32, No. 125, 1965, pp. 1–4; M. Olson: The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge 1965. A survey of more recent approaches to the theory of clubs is to be found in R. Cornes and T. Sandler: The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods, Cambridge 1986.
See for example R. Cornes and T. Sandler, op. cit., The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods, Cambridge 1986. p.24.
See for example the concept of the core in a treatment of coalitions from the point of view of game theory, such as J. McMillan: Game Theory in International Economics, Chur 1986.
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Reszat, B. European integration and international co-operation in exchange rate policy. Intereconomics 25, 45–48 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02924759
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02924759