Abstract
The present paper develops a theoretical model to address the relationship between a firm's pricing policy and its cost of increasing product quality. The model expresses both firm costs and firm revenues as functions of the quantity of a firm's output and overall product quality, where quality is expressed as quantity times quality per unit. The model starts with a generic good that measures output, and models quality as priced quality enhancement for each unit of the generic good. The model leads to decision rules by which the price of quality is a mark-up over the marginal cost of increasing product quality. The relationship between the price of quality and revenues from increasing output is also determined, and is conditioned by the sign and magnitude of the elasticity of demand for quality.
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Hegji, C.E. Cost-based decision rules for output, quality, and price. J Econ Finan 19, 27–37 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02920212
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02920212