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Game theory

2. Conventions and knowledge

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Abstract

This article tries to outline what game theory is all about. Part II explores concepts such as repeated games, social norms and common knowledge.

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Suggested Reading

  1. Becker G S. A Note on Restaurant Pricing and Other Examples of Social Influences on Prices.Journal of Political Economy. 99. 1109–1116, 1991.

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  2. Rubinstein A. The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under Almost Common Knowledge.American Economic Review. 79. 385–391, 1989.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Gen. A K Vaidya Marg Goregaon(East), 400065, Mumbai, India

    P. G. Babu

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  1. P. G. Babu
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Additional information

This paper is based in part on a lecture given at the Centre for Theoretical Studies, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore as part of a lecture series on ‘learning and evolution’. I am grateful to Vivek Borkar and Sanjay Jain for this opportunity. I thank the editor-in-charge of the paper for valuable comments. This is an expository article; no originality, other than that of the organization of material, is claimed.

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Babu, P.G. Game theory. Reson 3, 46–55 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02837345

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02837345

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