Summary
Starting from the acceptance of the Egalitarian Principle I exhibited a version which I considered too lax (BEP) and one I considered too strict (NEP), arriving at a version (MEP) which allows that there can be tolerance-limiting reasons for adhering to traditions but only if they are based on unreasoned knowledge claims. In fact, I hold that the situation most of us find ourselves in restricts such claims on religious topics to very general ones. Hence the choice between NEP and MEP is not significant.
It follows that we should take up one of two positions concerning religious traditions: either we argue from the shared assumptions of a variety of traditions without genuine participation in any of them; or we justify participation in one of them by noting various marks of reliability, such as serendipitous understanding.
Similar content being viewed by others
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
A version of this paper was read at the Faith and Reason Conference held at the Catholic Institute in Strathfield, October 5 and 6, 1996. I would like to thank all who participated in the discussion of my paper on that occasion. I would also like to thank the anonymous referees for Sophia for their helpful comments.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Forrest, P. Towards an epistemology of religious traditions. SOPHIA 38, 25–40 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02806409
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02806409