This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
References
Robert M. Adams, “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness”, in R. Adams,The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 97–122. This essay originally appeared in Gene Outka and John P. Reeder, Jr., eds.Religion and Morality (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor), 1973, pp. 318–347; Robert M. Adams, “Divine Command Metaethics Modified Again”, inThe Virtue of Faith, pp. 128–143.
Jeffrey Stout, “Metaethics and the Death of Meaning: Adams' Tantalising Closing”,Journal of Religious Ethics 6 (1978), pp. 1–143.
Adams, “Divine Command Metaethics Modified Again”, pp. 130.; cf. Stout, “Metaethics and the Death of Meaning”, Adams' Tantalising Closing”,Journal of Religious Ethics 6 (1978), pp. 5–6.
Cf., Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore,Holism: A Shopper's Guide (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).
Adams, p. 128, 139. Of course his argument needs to be examined, but it is, for reasons he mentions in his first essay,prima facie unacceptable.
Adams, p. 142.
Robert M. Adams, “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness,” ——, p. 97. Adams calls this the “unmodified divine command theory of ethical wrongness”. He distinguishes this theory, which he takes to be indefensible, from his “modified” version which he thinks is defensible.
Robert M. Adams, “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness,” ——, p. 98. Adams (unwisely) abandons this restriction in Adams, “Divine Command Metaethics Modified Once Again”. See,The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). pp. 128, 139.
Cf., Kai Nielsen,Ethics Without God, rev. ed. (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1990).
Another recent example is Alvin Plantinga's strange assertion that, for what he terms “the mature theist”, belief in God is a “properly basic belief”. He claims the believer is justified in believing in the existence of God apart from other beliefs she may hold by way of justification. The “mature theist” does not, according to Plantinga, base belief in God on other beliefs she has. Plantinga claims this was Calvin's view, and that it is the view of “reformed epistemology” generally. What is most odd about the theories of both Adams and Plantinga is not so much their epistemology (although Plantinga is wrong about belief in God being a properly basic belief), but that they attribute to the theist quite implausible views that theists generally do not hold, and yet they regard their claims asdescriptive. The first thing that should be said by way of criticising their respective theories is thatplainly theists do not generally hold these views. Certainly Calvin and Luther never held the view Plantinga attributes to them. I discuss Plantinga's claim inHume and The Problem of Miracles (Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer, 1989).
Adams, pp. 100–101.
SeeAdams, pp. 101–102, 106–107 for his explanation of why ethical discourse would break down. One reason he gives suggests a Wittgensteinian approach.
Adams, pp. 106–107. Adams attempts to “give a brief but fairly comprehensive description of the most important features of the Judeo-Christian ethical use of ‘wrong’, from the point of view of the modified divine command theory” (pp. 103–107)”. While some of that description is accurate as an “idealised” account, it does not support Adams's contention, central to his modified theory, concerning conditions for the “break down” of religious ethical discourse. It does not show, nor is it meant to show in any direct way, that such a break down would occur. “Idealised” has scare quotes around it because it is questionable whether his description portrays the “ideal” even from a theistic perspective. For Adams says: “In ethical contexts, the statement that a certain action is wrong normally expresses certain volitional and emotional attitudes towards that action” (p. 103). The reason he claims his description of the Judeo-Christian ethical use of ‘wrong’ is from “the point of view of the modified divine command theory”, rather than from the point of view of an unmodified theory is, I take it, that Adams does not claim “that such attitudes arealways expressed by statements of these sorts” and he is not “suggesting any analysis of themeaning of the statements in terms of the attitudes they normally express” (p. 103). But the description Adams gives is independent of the modified divine command theory he suggests is connected to it. It is (perhaps) an idealised description “of the Judeo-Christian ethical use of ‘wrong’”in general, and not just from the perspective of a modified divine command theory. The description he gives is essentially independent of his modified theory.
Adams, “A Modified Divine Command Theory, p. 122n.13. Adams does not refer to “meaning as use” but to Wittgenstein's view, central to his theory of “meaning as use”, that “If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgements”. Cf., Ludwig Wittgenstein,Philosophical Investigations, 2d ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), pt. I, sec. 242. See Adams, p. 102 for Adams's development of his theory on Wittgensteinian lines. Adams acknowledges that his approach is Wittgensteinian in “Divine Command Metaethics Modified Again,”The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 131.
Cf., Richard Swinburne,The Coherence of Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 204n.17 “That the rightness or wrongness of certain actions is unalterable by divine command is the view of Aquinas”. William of Ockham apparently held the view that “there are no limits to the obligations which would be produced by [God's] commands” (Swinburne, p. 208).
Robert M. Adams, “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness,” ——, p. 99.
Richard Swinburne,The Coherence of Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 179, 182. Swinburne, rejects a divine command theory. His view is that “some actions are right or wrong independently of what anyone commands, and ...some actions are made right or wrong by divine command ... Genocide and torturing children are wrong and would remain so whatever commands any person issued. It would follow ... thatno omniscient and perfectly free person could [emphasis mine] command us to do them” (p. 204). Swinburne goes on to say: “...if God has the properties which we discussed so far [i.e. omniscience, perfect freedom, etc.] and there is some action A which it would still be our duty not to do even if God commanded it; then ... God would not command us to do A ...God who necessarily wills the good [emphasis mine] would not incite us to evil” (p. 208). I take it that Swinburne's view as stated here is a more accurate account than is Adams's, or any divine command theorist's, of the view of both classical theism, and theists generally, concerning God's commands in relation to what is morally right.
Robert Adams, “A Modified Divine Command Theory”, ——, p. 101.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Levine, M. Adam's modified divine command theory of ethics. SOPH 33, 63–77 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02800539
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02800539