Skip to main content
Log in

On the alleged connection between moral evil and human freedom

  • Published:
Sophia Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Those who advance the traditional argument from human freedom presume that human freedom provides an adequate explanation of moral evil. I argue that this presumption is erroneous. An adequate explanation of our capacity to make choices that produce moral evil must be distinguished from an adequate explanation of the actuality of such choices. Human freedom may account for our ability to make choices that issue in moral evil. It cannot, by itself, account for our actually making such choices. Something more than our potential for choices that produce moral evil is required to adequately explain the profusion of moral evil that we actually find in the world.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Joel Thomas Tierno.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Tierno, J.T. On the alleged connection between moral evil and human freedom. SOPHIA 40, 1–6 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02782382

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02782382

Keywords

Navigation