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References
References to Diamond’s essay as well as to Wisdom’s work will be included in the body of the text. Diamond’s essay, “Wisdom’s Gods”Sophia vol. 22, 1983, will be referred to as WG; Wisdom’sParadox and Discovery, Oxford, 1965, will be referred to as PD, and hisPhilosophy and Psycho-Analysis, Oxford, 1953, as PP.
See D. Z. Phillips, “Wisdom’s Gods” inThe Philosophical Quarterly vol. 19, no. 74, 1969; reprinted in hisFaith and Philosophical Enquiry, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970.
In “Theology and Falsification” inNew Essays in Philosophical Theology, A. Flew and A. Macintyre (eds.), SCM, 1955.
R. S. Heimbeck, inTheology and Meaning, Allen and Unwin, 1969, sees this as a serious misreading of Hare, claiming that although Hare does sharply demarcate assertions frombliks, he also “everywhere hints thatbliks have cognitive import”. (p. 100, n. 1). It seems to me, however, that Passmore’s judgement to the effect that “Hare’s reasoning in this passage is distinctly odd.” (in “Christianity and Positivism” in theAustraliasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 35, 1957; p. 130) is much more sound. It is interesting to note here that in one passage in hisOur Experience of God, (Fontana, 1959, p. 65) H. D. Lewis comes close to accepting ablik-type posotion.
The point here is simply this: a religious expression may well be performative, but not on that account be totally devoid of cognitive import. Performative utterances, that is. presuppose the existence of appropriate conditions for their proper use; they ‘misfire’ if such condition do not obtain.
This is certainly true of such a Christian assertion as ‘God is three in one and one in three’ but not all Christian theological utterances are of this sort either. There are many that have what might be referred to as empirical entailments such as ‘Jesus of Nazareth is the son of God’, or ‘Jesus died for our sins’, etc. See on this matter, R. S. Heimbeck,op. cit. inTheology and Meaning, Allen and Unwin, 1969
The illustration is Wisdom’s; PD, p. 9.
Such a defence, I would argue, would also require a critique of Kuhn’s understanding of the role of anomalies in relation to ‘extraordinary’ science. Kuhn’s view of anomalies appears to be primarily negative in the sense that they create the pressure on the scientist to search for a new paradigm. Kuhn seems to suggest therefore that they play no positive role in the formulation or justification of the new paradigm. Although I have no hard evidence to offer here, it seems to me that, since it is not the solitary anomaly to a reigning paradigm but rather a number of critically important anomalies that force a theory’s abandonment, a pattern perceived, either consciously or unconsciously, in the anomalies themselves provide ‘clues’ for the development of alternative theories/paradigms and could also provide the initial ground of justificatory argument for the successful, new theory/paradigm. That ‘move’ in extraordinary science, I suggest therefore, is less arbitrary and radical than Kuhn perceives it to be.
Thomas Kuhn,The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press, 1962, p. 34.
Ibid., Thomas Kuhn,The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press, 1962, p. 152. Arguments, he insists are relevant to the persuasion of scientists.
Not all interpreters of Wisdom would agree with my understanding here. Besides Phillips and Diamond, one would have to include James Kellenberger who, for example, claims Wisdom in support of his thesis that religious knowledge is really non-hypothetical or nonexperimental in nature. He refers to religious knowledge then as non-hypothetical discovery (see hisReligious Discovery, Faith and Knowledge, Prentice-Hall, 1972, especially chapter one, and p. 12) However, it seems to me that when Kellenberger sees the acceptance of the evolutionary hypothesis in biological research as an example of non-hypothetical discovery (p. 19) he in fact supports the case being made out here.
See John Hick,Faith and Knowledge, Cornell University Press, 1966. I shall not attempt a defence of Hick here. Although he has come under severe criticism (see for example, W. Bean’s “Eschatological Verification … Fortress or Fairyland?” inMethodos, vol. 16, 1962) his position has, I think, been ably defended by T. Penelhum in hisReligious Knowledge, Macmillan Press, 1971.
John Hick,op. cit.,Faith and Knowledge, Cornell University Press, 1966. pp. 114, 115.
John Hick, “Theology and Verification”, inThe Existence of God, Macmillan, 1964, pp. 257, 258, 259.
Again, not all interpreters of Wisdom would agree with me on this point. R. Jenson, for example, (inThe Knowledge of Things Hoped For, OUP, 1969) takes these remarks, together with some of Wisdom’s remarks in “The Meaning of Life” (in PD) and develops a Wisdomian conception of verification akin to drama (or novel) interpretation. Macquarrie in “On Gods and Gardeners” (inContemporary Philosophic Thought, vol. 3,Perspectives in Education, Religion and the Arts, edited by H. E. Kiefer) insists that Wisdom’s main point is that sophisticated believers and non-believers no longer debate the now spurious question of whether there is a reality called ‘God’ or not. (see p. 107). The debate now rather is one about the character of the world. However, I think K. Nielsen’s claim that the disputes can be about both simultaneously is well taken. (See his “On Waste and Wastelands” in the same volume, especially p. 118).
Antony Flew, in the “University Discussion” inNew Essays in Philosophical Theology, op. cit. p. 96.
Ibid. Antony Flew, in the “University Discussion” inNew Essays in Philosophical Theology, op. cit p. 97.
It might just be pointed out here that Flew’s parable does not so much prove religious assertions to be meaningless as it tends to show them to be false. That is, signals of the divine are so meagre and weak in his picture of the world that one would be forced to conclude that God does not exist. And it is a moot point as to whether his parable parallels the situation in the real world.
J. A. Passmore in writing on Christianity and positivism some years ago remarked: “The deadness of logical positivism is more like the deadness of a dead metaphor than it is like the deadness of phlogiston theory … (A) dead metaphor can spring into renewed life in a particular context; positivism is most alive where it touches religion.” (“Christianity and Positivism” in theAustralasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 35, 1957, p. 128). R. S. Laura much more recently claims that “the remnants of positivist doctrine still exert considerable influence in the philosophical world, and theologians in particular are acutely aware of the perennial polemics bandied about in many theological discussions.” (“The Positivist Poltergeist and Some Difficulties with Wittgensteinian Liberation” inThe International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, vol. 2, 1971, p. 186). Whereas Laura claims that influence to be oppressive and illegitimate (resting on an uncritical acceptance of the synthetic/analytic distinction) W. H. Austin sees it as neither oppressive nor illegitimate (in “Religious Commitment and the Logical Status of Doctrines”. inReligious Studies, vol. 9, 1973, p. 39). Diamond stands in the tradition of Laura while I fall in with Austin, but we both agree with Passmore that positivism’s infuence, positively or negatively, is not yet over.
The problems here have been clearly delineated by the positivists themselves. See C. G. Hempel’s “Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive significance: Problems and Changes” in hisAspects of Scientific Explanation, Macmillan, 1965.
See here, for example, the claim of K. Nielsen in hisContemporary Critiques of Religion (Macmillan, 1971, p. 56). It is clear, however, that I do not agree with Nielsen’s further claim (on the same page) that those terms of verification need be observable, empirical terms. This issue cannot be taken up here. I refer the reader to three discussions of that issue: E. L. Mascal’sChristian Theology and Natural Science, Ronald Press, 1956 (especially pp. 81 ff.); M. Polyani’s Terry Lectures published asThe Tacit Dimension, Doubleday, 1967, (especially chapter 1); and Jean Ladriere’s Language and Belief,Macmillan, 1972, (especially pp. 80ff.).
J. A. Martin, The New Dialogue Between Theology and Philosophy, A. & C. Black, 1966, p. 64.
I have treated this issue at length elsewhere. See my “Comprehensively Critical Rationalism and Commitment” inPhilosophical Studies, vol. 21, 1973; “Explanation and Theological Method”, inZygon, vol. 11. 1976; and “Is Religious Belief Problematic”?, inChristian Scholar’s Review, vol. 7, 1977.
R. Jenson,op. cit.,The Knowledge of Things Hoped For, OUP, 1969 p. 133. See also on this score H. Owen,The Christian Knowledge of God, Athlone Press. 1969, especially pp. 16, 17.
R. M. Hare, “Theology and Falsification” inNew Essays in Philosophical Theology op. cit p. 99.
B. Mitchell, “Theology and Falsification”, inNew Essays in Philosophical Theology, pp. 103, 104.
This is brought out even more clearly by W. Austin in his comparison of central religious beliefs to the inner core beliefs of Lakatosian ‘research programmes’. See his “Religious Commitment and the Logical Status of Doctrines”,op. cit. inReligious Studies, vol. 9, 1973, p. 39).
B. Mitchell,op. cit., “Theology and Falsification”, inNew Essays in Philosophical Theology,p. 105.
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Wiebe, D. The cognitive status of religious belief. SOPH 23, 4–21 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02780882
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02780882