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Claims and the problem of evil

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References

  1. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974

  2. Where ‘the actual world’ and ‘∞’ designate rigidly.

  3. The same conclusion holds, of course, forany proposition reporting the obtaining of a state of affairs at a world W.

  4. SeeThe Nature of Necessity, p. 165.

  5. See his ‘ Reason and Belief in God,’ in Plantinga and Wolterstorff (eds.),Faith and Rationality (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), pp. 16–93.

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  6. Philosophical Topics 16 (1988), 119–132

  7. As may, I assume, be done without special justification, given that (as suggested above) the claim that some state of affairs obtains and the claim that it obtains in ∞ are truth-functionally equivalent.

  8. See his ‘The Probabilistic Argument From Evil’,Philosophical Studies 35 (1979), 1–53.

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  1. University of Calgary, Alberta, Canada

    J. L. Schellenberg

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  1. J. L. Schellenberg
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Schellenberg, J.L. Claims and the problem of evil. SOPH 32, 56–61 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02773080

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