Abstract
The Costs of Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade: Evidence from New Zealand. — Recent work on trade policy with imperfect competition indicates that the adverse effects of non-tariff barriers to trade exceed those suggested by traditional theory. With market power in foreign supply, setting a restrictive non-tariff barrier will induce foreign exporters to raise their supply prices. The authors use the experiment provided by the comprehensive New Zealand economic reforms of the mid-1980s. Using panel data on export unit values from Germany and the United States to several destinations including New Zealand, they find some evidence for decreased export prices to New Zealand as a result of the dismantling of non-tariff barriers to trade.
Zusammenfassung
Die Kosten nichttarifärer Handelshemmnisse. Evidenz aus Neuseeland. — Neuere Arbeiten über die Handelspolitik bei unvollständiger Konkurrenz deuten darauf hin, daß die nachteiligen Wirkungen nichttarifärer Handelsschranken größer sind als von der traditionellen Theorie angegeben. Wenn die ausländischen Anbieter Marktmacht besitzen, wird die Errichtung eines nichttarifären Handelshemmnisses sie veranlassen, ihre Angebotspreise zu erhöhen. Die Verfasser nutzen das Experiment, das die umfassenden Wirtschaftsreformen Neuseelands in der Mitte der achtziger Jahre boten. Sie ermitteln unter Verwendung von Panel-Daten über Durch-schnittswerte für die Exporte aus Deutschland und den Vereinigten Staaten in mehrere Länder einschließlich Neuseelands einige Belege dafür, daß Exportpreise nach Neuseeland als Folge des Abbaus von Handelsschranken gesunken sind.
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