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Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv

, Volume 123, Issue 2, pp 232–248 | Cite as

Public choice of economic policy: The growth of agricultural protection

  • Arsenio M. Balisacan
  • James A. Roumasset
Article

Keywords

Public Choice Political Influence Urban Consumer Coalition Size Market Surplus 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Zusammenfassung

“Public choice” und Wirtschaftspolitik: Die Zunahme der Agrarprotektion. - In diesem Aufsatz wird konzeptionell ein Rahmen entwickelt, um die Gründe für die jeweilige Wirtschaftspolitik zu erklären und um ein verbreitetes Phónomen der wirtschaftlichen Protektion zu interpretieren, das von verschiedenen Untersuchungen bestótigt wird, näomlich die Tendenz der Agrarprotektion, mit steigendem Entwicklungsniveau anzuwachsen. Das Modell umfaßt die “public-choice”-Theorie des politischen Einflusses von Gruppen in einem nichtkooperativen System, an dem die Befürworter und Gegner einer bestimmten Wirtschaftspolitik beteiligt sind. In den frühen Phasen der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung schlógt die Waage des politischen Einflusses meist zugunsten der Konsumenten und der Industrie aus. Wenn der Entwicklungsprozeßvoranschreitet, verschieben sich die Gewichte zugunsten der landwirtschaftlichen Erzeuger. Bei hóherem Entwicklungsstand werden die Realeinkommen der Landwirte empfindlicher in bezug auf die Agrarpreise, wóhrend die Konsumentenwohlfahrt und die nicht-landwirtschaftlichen Gewinne davon weniger berührt werden.

Résumé

«Public choice» et la politique économique: La croissance de la protection agricole. - Dans cette étude les auteurs développent un cadre conceptuel pour expliquer les causes de la politique économique et l’appliquent pour interpréter une structure pervasive concernant la protection économique qui est consistante avec plusieurs études: la tendance de la protection agricole d’accroÎtre avec le niveau de développement économique. Le modèle inclut les aspects de la théorie du «public choice» d’une provision de groupe de l’influence politique en cadre non-coopératif concernant les propagateurs et les opposants d’une certaine politique publique. En jeune stage du développement, la balance de l’influence politique a la tendance de se pencher envers les consommateurs et les producteurs industriels. Si le développement s’avance la balance se tourne en faveur des producteurs agricoles. Aux niveaux plus hauts du développement, les revenus réels des producteurs agricoles deviennent plus sensitifs au prix agricole pendant que le bien-Être des consommateurs et les profits non-agricoles deviennent moins sensitifs.

Resumen

«Public choice» de politica económica: el aumento de la protection a la agriculture. - En este trabajo se desarrolla un marco conceptual para explicar las causas de la politica económica y se lo aplica con el fin de interpretar una pauta comÚn en relation a la protection económica: la tendencia que tiene la protection a la agriculture de aumentar con el nivel de desarrollo económico. El modelo contiene aspectos de «public choice» en cuanto a la influencia poh’tica de grupos sociales en un contexto no cooperativo abarcando a defensores y opositores de una cierta politica. En las primeras etapas del desarrollo la balanza de influencia politica tiende a inclinarse en favor de los consumidores y de los productores industriales. Con el avance del desarrollo la balanza se inclina en favor de los productores de la agricultura. En las etapas avanzadas del desarrollo el ingreso real de los productores de la agriculture se torna más sensitivo al precio mientras que el bienestar del consumidor y los beneficios de los demás sectores se tornan menos sensitivos al precio.

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Copyright information

© Institut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel 1987

Authors and Affiliations

  • Arsenio M. Balisacan
  • James A. Roumasset

There are no affiliations available

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