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The logic of public policy design: Linking policy actors and plausible instruments

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His principal interest lies in policy analysis, currently focusing on policy design and implementation issues. His most recent work has appeared inPolicy Studies Review, Milbank Quarterly, andJournal of Policy Analysis and Management.

He currently is working on several research interests in comparative public administration and policy design.

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Linder, S., Peters, B.G. The logic of public policy design: Linking policy actors and plausible instruments. Knowledge and Policy 4, 125–151 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02692751

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Keywords

  • Design Space
  • Policy Analysis
  • Policy Design
  • Social Regulation
  • Compliance Mechanism