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Don’t buy from me Argentina: Politics, economics, and trade liberalization in Argentina, 1992–2001

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Abstract

Recently, while opening their markets to international trade through tariff reduction, developing nations have been quietly adopting nontariff measures that impose new barriers on imports. This study contributes to a literature that assesses reactions to recent widespread economic reform, particularly in the developing world. While analysts have identified many determinants of the reform process, we are only beginning to assess the factors that shape its twists, turns, and even reversals. In particular, we do not yet have a clear understanding of the determinants of governments’ treatment of different groups and actors in this process. This article examines these reactions to trade liberalization in Argentina, an important middle-income nation, by drawing upon the significant body of theoretical and empirical literature on trade policy in developed nations that demonstrates that both economic and political factors condition policy implementation. Utilizing a data set of nontariff trade disputes from 1992 to 2001, the analysis employs probit maximum likelihood techniques to assess the relationship between trade policy outputs and economic and political factors. The findings suggest that economic factors, including import flows, and political factors such as the breadth of representation appear to condition trade policy decisions in Argentina. The results also suggest that overall macroeconomic context affects policy outputs.

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Authors
  1. Jeffrey Drope
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Additional information

Jeffrey Drope is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Miami. His recent articles and current research examine the political economy of trade policy and, more generally, how interests and institutions interact to generate policy.

I thank Wendy Hansen, Ken Roberts, and theSCID reviewers and editors for valuable comments, the Latin American Institute at the University of New Mexico for financial support, and Pablo Sanguinetti for helpful introductions in Argentina.

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Drope, J. Don’t buy from me Argentina: Politics, economics, and trade liberalization in Argentina, 1992–2001. St Comp Int Dev 41, 53–75 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02686307

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