Abstract
We use major league baseball data to examine risk and final-offer arbitration usage. Risk attitudes are proxied by the likelihood that FOA-generated salary increases place the player’s baseball employment at risk. Employment risk is inversely related to player quality. Our evidence suggests that higher-quality (low-risk) players are more likely to file for arbitration and seek an arbitrated settlement than lowerquality (high-risk) players.
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We thank Paul Burgess for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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Marburger, D.R., Scoggins, J.F. Risk and final offer arbitration usage rates: Evidence from major league baseball. Journal of Labor Research 17, 735–745 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02685811
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02685811