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Marginal revenue and labor strife in major league baseball

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Abstract

An improved model of baseball player performance and revenue generation shows that, overall, major league players are paid more than the marginal revenue they generate from spectators at the ballpark. Broadcast revenue is shown to be a factor in player salaries, although this revenue is not sensitive to individual player output. Under the current bargaining procedure, collective action in baseball is therefore viewed as the only way to entice owners to pay players for the broadcast revenue they generate.

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Oorlog, D.R. Marginal revenue and labor strife in major league baseball. Journal of Labor Research 16, 25–42 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02685711

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