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Agency costs, property rights, and the evolution of labor unions

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Abstract

Collective bargaining requires that an agent represent workers. This paper examines the implications for the trade union movement of the resulting agency costs. Without transferable rights in the union, union members lack the means and incentive to bring forth the innovative agent controls common to the modern corporation. Considerations of the bargaining strengths of employers and employees, each represented by an agent, provide an explanation of the simultaneous decline of private sector union membership (corporate share holders have been more successful at lowering agency costs) and growth of public sector union representation (where the union official, a “double agent,” serves the interest of both employee and bureaucratic employer).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of South Florida, 33620, Tampa, FL

    Don Bellante & Philip K. Porter

Authors
  1. Don Bellante
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  2. Philip K. Porter
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Additional information

The authors acknowledge the helpful remarks Donald L. Martin whose earlier research on property rights in unions inspired this effort. Don Bellante’s work was supported by a grant from the Research Committee of the College of Business Administration, University of South Florida.

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Bellante, D., Porter, P.K. Agency costs, property rights, and the evolution of labor unions. Journal of Labor Research 13, 243–256 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02685483

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