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From union hegemony to union disintegration: Collective bargaining in cement and related industries

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An Erratum to this article was published on 01 September 1990

Abstract

The cement industry provides an interesting example of the impact of collective bargaining where management determines that it cannot afford a strike, yields to extreme union demands, but deludes itself that it can withstand the economic impact of unionism under such circumstances because almost all competitors are similarly situated and labor costs can be partially offset by automation. The small Cement, Lime, and Gypsum Workers Union won not only high wages and benefits, but imposed restrictive rules as severe as those in any industry. Eventually, however, foreign competition and economic realities forced the companies to revolt, and the union found that it could not sustain strikes. An ill-conceived merger broke up, an independent union was formed, and today unionism, once so strong, is weak and divided as management imposes or forces acceptance of its conditions. The story, while unique in many ways, resembles what has occurred in other industries with high fixed costs, militant unions, and the reluctance of management to sacrifice current gains for longer run needs.

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References

  1. For charts depicting modern cement manufacture, seeA Competitive Assessment of the U.S. Cement Industry, U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 4–5.

  2. Production, Employment, and Productivity in 59 Manufacturing Industries (Philadelphia: Works Progress Administration National Research Project, 1939), p. 30.

  3. Ibid.

  4. Wilton Johnson, “Cement,” preprint from the U.S. Bureau of Mines,Mineral Yearbook (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 2.

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  5. For a current analysis of the union-nonunion split in construction, see Herbert R. Northrup, “Construction Doublebreasted Operations and Pre-Hire Agreements: Assessing the Issue,”Journal of Labor Research 10 (Spring 1989): 215–38.

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  7. Employment and Earnings, Vol. 35 (January 1988), p. 35, Table B-2.

  8. Data from 1982 U.S. Census of Manufacturers’ Industry Series, SIC 3241, 1982, and from Johnson, note 5 above, Table 2, p. 4.

  9. “Cement,” in1988 U.S. Industrial Outlook (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, 1988), 2.4.5. Mexico, Canada, and Spain are the leading exporters to the U.S.

  10. Quicklime, calcium oxide, hydrated lime, calcium hydroxide, dolomite quicklime, two types of dolomite hydrate, and deadburned dolomite.

  11. Laurence Pelham, “Lime,” preprint from the U.S. Bureau of Mines,Mineral Yearbook (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 1. Calcination is the oxidizing or making a substance powdery by heat.

  12. Pelham, “Lime,” note 12 above, p. 2.

  13. Ibid.

  14. Data from 1982 U.S. Census of Manufacturers, Industry Series, SIC 3274.

  15. Domtar now operates 12 gypsum wallboard plants in the United States, having purchased several since 1986. SeeWall Street Journal, June 3, 1988, p. 25. Georgia Pacific is continuing to expand in this area and is building additional capacity.

  16. Lawrence L. Davis, “Gypsum,” preprint from the U.S. Bureau of Mines,Mineral Yearbook (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 1. These data antedate the massive expansion of Domtar in this market.

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  17. Ibid., “Gypsum,” preprint from the U.S. Bureau of Mines,Mineral Yearbook (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 2.

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  18. Data from 1982 U.S. Census of Manufacturers, Industry Series, SIC 3275.

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  20. Historical information is from Philip Taft, “Brief Review of Other Industries: C. Cement,” inHow Collective Bargaining Works (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1942), pp. 912–913; “A Brief History of the United Cement, Lime, Gypsum Workers International Union,”Voice, October 1978, pp. 7–24; “Historical Highlights,”Voice, October 1982, pp. 22–23; and CLGWU convention proceedings.Voice was the official journal of the CLGWU.

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  21. Taft, “Cement,” p. 912.

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  23. “Historic Highlights,” p. 23.

  24. Clark,Unions and Productivity, p. 52.

  25. Information based upon confidential company interviews and notes thereform over the years and updated, January–April 1988, and upon various issues of theVoice.

  26. Ibid. The Armstrong plant once employed 1,100 persons and in 1988 had a bargaining unit of about 750. Data from company.

  27. Taft, “Cement,” p. 912.

  28. See, e.g.,Voice, December 1978, p. 4. Kaolin is a pure white clay which is utilized in the manufacture of porcelain and bleached paper.

  29. “Historic Highlights,” p. 23.

  30. United Cement, Lime, and Gypsum Workers International,Proceedings of the Tenth International Convention (Dallas, TX, 1960), p. 27. (All conventions hereinafter cited asProceedings).

  31. Proceedings (San Diego, CA, 1970), p. 61.

  32. Proceedings (Louisville, KY, 1966), p. 67; ibid. (Miami Beach, FL, 1968), p. 26; ibid. (Toronto, Ont., Canada, 1974), p. 55; ibid. (Las Vegas, NV), p. 10; andVoice (March/April 1984), p. 4.

  33. A history of the IPC and its policies to that date are found inProceedings (Long Beach, CA, 1952), pp. 5–9.

  34. At the 1950 convention, Schoenberg bitterly criticized the first vice-president, Arthur Strunck, for not supporting an IPC policy. Strunck, who was a possible candidate to succeed Schoenberg, left the convention and did not seek reelection.Proceedings (St. Louis, MO, 1950), pp. 113, 129–30.

  35. Proceedings (Buffalo, NY, 1950), pp. 20–21.

  36. Reproduced inProceedings (Long Beach, CA, 1952), p. 237.

  37. SeeProceedings (New Orleans, LA, 1954), pp. 221–257, for detailed discussion of these issues.

  38. Proceedings (Buffalo, NY, 1956), pp. 13, 203.

  39. See “Big Cement Firms Hold Firm Against Industry-Wide Labor Pact,”Wall Street Journal, July 3, 1957, p. 2.

  40. “The Big Cement Strike,”Voice, October 1978, p. 13.

  41. “Big Cement Companies,” note 42, above; “Cement Workers’ Walkout Entering Second Week: Outlook Dim for Quick End as Meany Backs Strike,”Wall Street Journal, July 5, 1957, p. 16; “Four More Cement Plants Struck: Total Now Tops 60,”Wall Street Journal, July 8, 1957, p. 5; “Cement Industry Hit by New Strike as 1,200 Go Out at General Portland,”Wall Street Journal, July 11, 1957, p. 2.

  42. “Cement Workers’ Strike Halts Work on Highways, Schools, Airports, Other Projects in East and South,”Wall Street Journal, July 12, 1957, p. 3; and “Strike Brings Cement Price Premiums of 8% to 77%: Higher Freight Charges Blamed: ‘Gray Market’ Denied,”Wall Street Journal, July 15, 1957, p. 2.

  43. “Cement Workers’ Walkout Entering Second Week,” note 44 above; and “Cement Workers’ Strike Halts Work,” note 45 above.

  44. “Universal Atlas, Cement Workers Agree on Contract: Union Will Seek Similar Pacts with Other Companies,”Wall Street Journal, July 29, 1957, p. 2.

  45. Ibid.

  46. “Cement Union Reports First 1959 Agreement in Industry at Denver,”Daily Labor Report (No. 17), June 16, 1959, p. A-11.

  47. “Cement Workers Threaten Strike if ‘Model’ Settlement Is Not Adopted,”Daily Labor Report (No. 82), April 28, 1961, p. A-4.

  48. S. H. Paige,Portland Cement Industry, 1969 Labor Negotiations — United Cement, Lime, and Gypsum Workers (duplicated, June 25, 1969), p. 1. See also “Cement Industry Settlement Said to Pose Problems for U.S. Stabilizers,”Construction Labor Report, (No. 1181), June 28, 1978, p. X-2.

  49. Ibid., p. 5.

  50. Proceedings (San Diego, CA, 1970), p. 62.

  51. Paige,Portland Cement Industry, note 51 above, p. 4.

  52. Ibid., p. 1.

  53. Ibid., p. 3.

  54. Ibid., p. 1.

  55. For an early analysis of the IUD’s policies, see William N. Chernish,Coalition Bargaining (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969).

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  56. Telephone interview, April 13, 1988.

  57. Telephone interviews, April 21 and June 3, 1988. See also “Cement Industry Settlement,” note 51 above, pp. X-1–3.

  58. SeeVoice, February 1978, pp. 8–10, for a list of CLGWU demands on fringe benefits and restrictive rules.

  59. These provisions are excerpted from contracts applying to the period 1975–1981 and on file in the offices of the CEA. Contracts examined include those of Lone Star, Universal Atlas, Ideal, General Portland, Medusa, and Martin Marietta. Most of the clauses referred to in the text were standard with all companies; variations were minor. See alsoVoice, February 1978, pp. 9–10.

  60. The CLGWU safety provision is found inVoice, February 1978, p. 10.

  61. Kim B. Clark, “The Impact of Unionization on Productivity: A Case Study,”Industrial and Labor Relations Review 33 (July 1980), pp. 451–69 and “Unionization and Productivity: Microeconomic Evidence,”Quarterly Journal of Economics 95 (December 1980): 613–39. Freeman and Medoff in particular utilize this study to push their thesis. See Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff,What Do Unions Do? (New York: Basic Books, 1984), chapter 11.

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  62. Clark first examined six plants that had been nonunion, but were later unionized. In his second work, he examined nine plants that had become unionized after operating nonunion, six that continued to operate nonunion, and 119 operating units. The nonunion plants were relatively small and therefore operated with less extensive equipment. For an excellent criticism of Clark and the balance of this literature, see Barry T. Hirsch and John T. Addison,The Economic Analysis of Unions (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986), chapter 7.

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  63. The CLGWU reaction is found inVoice, February 1980, p. 7. No written response by industry officials has been uncovered. When this writer asked industry executives about the Clark thesis, the most common responses were either a smile and shake of the head or a comment that the author was totally unrealistic.

  64. In 1976, Copley Cement Company, Nazareth, Pennsylvania, was acquired by the largest cement producer in France, Société des Ciments Française. The new owners built a $55 million dry process plant, one of the first in the United States, with a capacity of 1.1 million tons which replaced 11 smaller plants, seven of which were more than 50 years old. Victor K. McElheny, “Cement Is Being Fired Up With New Plants, New Technology,”New York Times, December 25, 1978, p. F-3. For a pictorial illustration of the differences in production methodology between the wet and dry processes, see the reference in note 2 above.

  65. Data from U.S. Department of Interior,Minerals Yearbook, 1980, p. 182.

  66. Telephone interview, vice-president of company involved which is no longer in the cement business, May 24, 1988; David Stipp, “Maine Indian Tribe in Sale of Well-Managed Plant,”Wall Street Journal, July 21, 1988, p. 20; and Alan R. Gold, “A Financial Coup for Indians in a Cement Deal in Maine,”New York Times, July 21, 1988, p. D1.

  67. Paige,Portland Cement Industry, note 51 above, pp. 14–15.

  68. Ibid., p. 10.

  69. Ibid. This analysis of the situation by the editors of theConstruction Labor Report, published by the Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., notes 51 and 60 above, is in remarkable agreement with Paige’s analysis.

  70. Group Bargaining in the Cement Industry (Duplicated, November 26, 1974). The delay in publishing the report was apparently attributable to efforts to gain maximum consensus among the companies.

  71. The airline mutual aid pact was effectively abolished by a provision in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 after intense union lobbying. Congress did not, however, restrain union mutual aid which is extensive in this industry. See Herbert R. Northrup, “The New Employee-Relations Climate in Airlines,”Industrial and Labor Relations Review 36 (January 1983), especially p. 108 and the citations therein.

  72. The founders included Medusa, Marquette, Universal Atlas division of U.S Steel, Lehigh Portland, Lone Star, Ideal, California Portland, Penn-Dixie, Louisville, Monarch, and Citadel.

  73. See “Companies Form Opposition Group,”Voice, February 1978, p. 8.

  74. The CLGWU reports on visits to Heidelberger Zement are found inVoice, March 1980, pp. 16–19, and March 1981, pp. 1–2.

  75. Robert T. Gray, the last executive of the CPBA, regarded the impending defection of Lehigh Portland as being at Heidelberger’s orders and a fatal blow to the already weakened CPBA. Telephone interview, May 1980.

  76. Proceedings (Dallas, TX, 1960), p. 6.

  77. Proceedings (San Diego, CA, 1970), pp. 302–04. Miechur received 160 votes, Northrip 98. Prior to the nominations, Northrip and others criticized the system in which the president handpicked his successor by appointing him administrative assistant (pp. 254–66).

  78. Proceedings (Toronto, Oct. 1974), pp. 371–72, 378. Northrip defeated William Mason, another district official, 246–69 for the post vacated by retiring Reuben Roe.

  79. The discussion of Moore McCormack is based upon interviews with a number of persons knowledgeable of the situation who demanded anonymity, plus numerous articles inVoice, particularly July 1981, pp. 18–20; September 1981, pp. 12–14; November 1981, pp. 12–13; March 1982, p. 4; January 1983, pp. 12–14; and January/February 1984, p. 12. In 1988, Moore McCormack was taken over by Southdown, Inc., a major Texas cement concern, after a hostile bid. Southdown disposed of Moore’s non-cement assets and sold the Glens Falls plant to a Spanish concern. The Moore McCormack labor policies are, however, being maintained by Southdown.

  80. Kosmos Cement Co., Inc. 9-RD-1076, May 1982. Data from Wharton Industrial Research Unit NLRB election file.

  81. Data from Portland Cement Association.

  82. Agis Salpukas, “Penn-Dixie Files Under Chapter 11,”New York Times, April 8, 1980, p. D-5. Moore McCormack purchased two of Penn-Dixie’s plants and converted them into terminals. During the early 1980s,Voice reported a plant closing in many of its issues. See also, “Building Up to a Shortage in Cement,”Business Week, May 5, 1980, p. 138.

  83. Copy of contract in author’s possession; “Cement Pattern Won in Lone Star Talks,”Voice, April 1981, p. 5; and “Cement Workers Settlement with Lone Star Expected to Set Pattern for 17,000 Workers,”Daily Labor Report (No. 77), April 22, 1981, p. A-4.

  84. “More Pacts in Cement,”Voice, May 1981, p. 5; and “Ten Cement Locals Strike,”Voice, May 1981, p. 9.

  85. “Cement Is Set in a Profitless Recovery,”Business Week, June 20, 1983, p. 121; and Donald F. Cuff, “Cement Poised for Recovery,”New York Times, February 17, 1986, pp. 19, 21.

  86. “Cement Is Set,” note 95 above.

  87. Letter to author from then vice-president of company who attended the meeting, December 30, 1981; telephone interview same individual, now retired, June 3, 1988; and telephone interviews, vice-presidents of two other companies, June 3, 1988, and January 17, 1989.

  88. Ibid.

  89. Ibid.

  90. Telephone interview, company industrial relations executive, April 21, 1988; andVoice, March/April 1984, p. 7. This was the last issue ofVoice.

  91. Lehigh was later found to have violated the Taft-Hartley Act by imposing its last offer without actually bargaining to an impasse (Lehigh Portland Cement Company, 286 N.L.R.B. No. 133 (November 30, 1987); and ibid., 287 N.L.R.B. No. 96 (January 5, 1988). The company, however, sued the union for striking without giving notice of contract termination as provided by the 1981 agreement between the parties. SeeLehigh Portland Cement v. Cement, Lime, Gypsum and Allied Workers Division, 849 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1988). These litigations were settled as part of the contract between the company and the cement division of the Boilermakers, reached in September 1988, the first agreement between the parties since the 1981–1984 period.

  92. Based upon the author following the developments in 1984, and discussions since then with various union and company officials. See alsoVoice, March/April 1984, p. 7.

  93. Proceedings (Miami Beach, FL, 1968), pp. 34–35; andProceedings (San Diego, CA, 1970), p. 20.

  94. Proceedings (San Diego, CA, 1970), pp. 20–21.

  95. Ibid.

  96. Proceedings (Las Vegas, NV, 1972), pp. 19–21.

  97. Proceedings (St. Paul, MN, 1982), p. 21.

  98. Ibid., pp. 22–25.

  99. Ibid., pp. 86–91, 110. In 1976, the CLGWU convention voted to set dues as a percentage of wages. This, as Northrip pointed out at each convention thereafter, was effective in keeping the union solvent. Two other helpful developments were the ability to invest union funds at high interest rates during the late 1970s inflation and grants totaling several hundred thousand dollars from the U.S. Occupational Health and Safety Administration.

  100. Proceedings (St. Paul, MN, 1982), pp. 28–29. The IBB had still not sold the land one year after the merger.

  101. Proceedings Special Merger Convention (Las Vegas, NV, 1984).

  102. Miechur’s letter was dated December 15, 1983; he retired effective January 8, 1984, when he was succeeded by Northrip. Henry W. Bechtholdt was elevated to secretary-treasurer from second vice-president at the same time. A copy of the merger agreement is in the author’s possession. After the merger broke apart and the IWNA was formed, Miechur led a group of retired CLGWU, including his father-in-law and predecessor as president, Felix Jones, to issue a statement supporting the IBB and condemning the IWNA. SeeBoilermakers Blacksmiths Reporter, October 1987, p. 3.

  103. Boilermakers Blacksmiths Reporter, July–August 1986, p. 3.

  104. See Table 3, above. The activities of the IBB Cement Division are reported upon in theBoilermakers Blacksmiths Reporter throughout 1984–86. At the merger convention, Northrip stated that at a membership level of 24,000, income would exceed expenses by $100,000, but if the “membership falls down to 22,000 or 21,000, we are going to have some problems...”Proceedings Special Merger Convention (Las Vegas, NV, 1984), pp. 10, 83.

  105. “Incumbent Boilermakers President Wins Five-Year Term by 80 Votes,”Daily Labor Report (No. 164), August 25, 1986, p. A-12.

  106. The fact that Northrip had far greater support among the former CLGWU delegates has been confirmed in many statements and litigations since the convention. See, for example,Georgia Kaolin Company, 287 NLRB No. 50 (December 16, 1987), and particularly the regional director’s direction of election which the Board decision overturned.

  107. SeeGeorgia Kaolin Company, note 119 above.

  108. Copies of all contracts discussed are in the author’s possession.

  109. For a case involving a shutdown and new ownership operating nonunion, seeMissouri Portland Cement Co., 291 NLRB No. 146 (December 9, 1988).

  110. These litigations have given the IBB local union properties and dues checkoff monies that local unions have owned and received prior to membership NLRB votes which transferred affiliation and bargaining rights to the IWNA. The effect has been to hurt the already financially weak IWNA. In a letter sent to his membership and to members of Congress dated January 27, 1989, IWNA President Northrip complained bitterly about these decisions, but the courts clearly appear to be applying the IBB constitution and the merger agreement. SeeInternational Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Local Lodge D111, 858 F. 2d 1559 (11 cir. 1988); and International Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Local Lodge D504 et al., _____ F.2d _____ (3rd cir., February 1, 1989).

  111. The proposed resolution ending the merger was prepared and distributed July 24, 1986. (Letter in author’s possession.) It was defeated at the convention.Boilermakers and Blacksmiths Reporter, September 1986, p. 4. In a letter to the membership dated November 12, 1986, President Jones declared that the resolution had been voted on twice, first by just the cement division delegates and then by all delegates, and had each time been defeated. (Letter in author’s possession.)

  112. These rules and regulations are found in theProceedings of Founding Convention (Las Vegas, NV, August 6–10, 1987), and in the IWNA’s separately published constitution.

  113. In a court hearing in Macon, Georgia, Northrip declared that the IWNA could not pay a judgment because it had no money; that it was “two months in arrears to staff and salaries.”Macon Telegraph and News, July 20, 1988.

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  1. The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 19104, Philadelphia, PA

    Herbert R. Northrup

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Professor Emeritus of Management and former Director, Industrial Research Unit. Ms. Sue Torelli, Librarian, Industrial Research Unit, and Kevin Barry, Librarian, Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University, provided helpful information and numerous documents.

An erratum to this article is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02685407.

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Northrup, H.R. From union hegemony to union disintegration: Collective bargaining in cement and related industries. Journal of Labor Research 10, 337–376 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02685329

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