Summary and Conclusions
The empirical data are compatible with the hypothesis that employers respond to union wage premiums by raising the educational component of hiring standards. This behavioral mechanism by which rents are liquidated appears to be bringing about a significant shift in the quality location of American workers. More education increasingly represents preparation for a union job. Normative considerations aside, the implications of the process for the distribution of income and for the allocation of educational resources would seem to warrant serious consideration.
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Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri. This paper was prepared under Grant No. 21-29-73-49 from the Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, but points of view expressed do not necessarily represent the official position or policy of the Department of Labor. The authors are indebted to Lee Benham, Roger Blair, Wesley Mellow and Frederick Warren-Boulton for helpful criticisms and suggestions. Carl Kaiser assisted with the computations. Edward Kalachek died suddenly on December 9, 1979.
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Kalachek, E., Raines, F. Trade unions and hiring standards. Journal of Labor Research 1, 63–75 (1980). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02685199
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02685199