Abstract
One of the original arguments in support of the Davis-Bacon Act was that local construction labor would be protected from wage-busting on federal projects by “ruthless non-local contractors” using low-wage, itinerant labor. A related, current claim is that Davis-Bacon prevents lower quality non-local firms from winning contracts by underbidding local labor; thus, Davis-Bacon helps to ensure the quality of construction. This paper first evaluates whether the use of itinerant non-local firmsnecessarily results in lower quality output. Using the “traveling” symphony orchestra as an analogy, the answer is clearly “no.” Second, if higher quality output may be produced by non-local firms, is this likely to happen in construction? Third, does a Davis-Bacon type of wage floor ensure that local projects will be built by local firms or crews?
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References
Goldblatt, Abraham and Patrick MacAuley. “The 1977 Census of Construction: A Wealth of Economic Data.”Construction Review (January 1981): 4–11.
Goldfarb, Robert S. and John E. Morrall III. “The Davis-Bacon Act: An Appraisal of Recent Studies.”Industrial and Labor Relations Review 34 (January 1981): 191–206.
Metzger, Michael R. and Robert S. Goldfarb. “Do Davis-Bacon Wages Raise Product Quality?”Journal of Labor Research 4 (Summer 1983): 265–72.
U.S. General Accounting Office (USGAO).The Davis-Bacon Act Should Be Repealed. HRD-79-18. April 27, 1979.
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The author wishes to thank Stephen Weber for very helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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Goldfarb, R.S. A Davis-Bacon musicale: Symphony orchestras as migrant labor. Journal of Labor Research 5, 427–433 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02685093
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02685093