References
See D. Heldman,American Labor Unions: Political Values and Financial Structure (Washington, D.C.: Council on American Affairs, 1977), pp. 17–21
Daily Labor Report (BNA), No. 85, p. E-1 (May 2, 1983).
Railway Employes’ Department v.Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
See Wright, “Clipping the Political Wings of Labor Unions: An Examination of Existing Law and Proposals for Change,”Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 5 (1982): 4–12;
Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v.United States, 407 U.S. 385, 409–12 (1972).
International Association of Machinists v.Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
Brotherhood of Railway Clerks v.Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963).
Ibid., at 122.
431 U.S. 209 (1977).
Ibid., at 232.
Ibid., at 233–34.
See, for example,Blount v.Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419 (1971).
Abood, 431 U.S. at 237.
83 Wis. 2d 316, 333, 265 N.W.2d 559, 567 (1978).
565 F. Supp. 942 (D.N.J. 1983); earlier proceedings, 547 F. Supp. 1297 (1982).
Abood, 431 U.S. at 236.
Dale, “Union Dues, Individual Rights, and the Constitution,”Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 1 (1978): 105, 151;
Vieira, “Constitutional Limitations on the Assessment of Agency Fees in Public Sector Employment,”Government Union Review 3 (Fall 1982): 31;
“The Supreme Court, 1976 Term,”Harvard Law Review 91 (1977): 70, 196–98.
See, for example,Wooley v.Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715–17 (1977);Elrod v.Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362–63 (1976) (plurality opinion);Buckley v.Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64–65 (1975);Kusper v.Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58 (1973);NAACP v.Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958). All of these cases were relied on by the Supreme Court’s decision inAbood.
84 Mich. App. 383, 395–96, 269 N.W.2d 607, 612–13 (1978).
Daily Labor Report (BNA), No. 166, p. D-4 (August 25, 1980) (Special Master’s Report); adopted, 112 L.R.R.M. 3069 (D. Md. 1983).
547 F. Supp. at 1316–17.
559 F. Supp. 754, 770 (D.N.J. 1983).
685 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1982); cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1767 (1983) (No. 82-1150).
78 Lab. Cas. ¶ 11,290, 79 Lab. Cas. ¶ 11,765 (1976) (interlocutory summary judgment); incorporated, 88 Lab. Cas. ¶ 11,986 (S.D. Cal. 1980); aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 685 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1982); cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1767 (1983) (No. 82-1150).
Ellis, 685 F.2d at 1072–75;contra id. at 1075–76 (J. Whelan dissenting).
Browne v.Milwaukee Board of School Directors, Case XCIX No. 23535 MP-892, Decision No. 18408, slip op. at 22–23, 28–33 (Wis. Empl. Rel. Comm’n Feb. 6, 1981);Cumero v.King City High School District Association, Case Nos. SF-CO-5, -72, -73, -74, Decision No. 197, slip op. at 10–23 (Cal. Pub. Empl. Rel. Bd. Mar. 3, 1982).
Abood, 431 U.S. at 237.
Ibid., at 244 (J. Stevens concurring).
Elrod v.Burns, 427 U.S. at 373.
Ball, 84 Mich. App. at 397, 269 N.W.2d at 613.
Ibid., at 393–94, 269 N.W.2d at 612. An excellent analysis ofBall is found in J. Sullivan, “Freedom of Association and the Public Sector Agency Shop:Ball v. Detroit andAbood v. Detroit Board of Education,”Dickinson Law Review 85 (1980): 21.
385 Mass. 70, 77–85, 431 N.E.2d 180, 185–89 (1982).
547 F. Supp. at 1322; see also 565 F. Supp. at 945–46.
101 Mich. App. 309, 318–19, 300 N.W.2d 551, 554–55 (1980).
Street, 367 U.S. at 780 (J. Whittaker dissenting); ibid., at 795–96 (J. Black dissenting).
83 Wis. 2d at 334–340b, 265 N.W.2d at 568–71.
SeeAbood, 431 U.S. at 239, n.40;Allen, 373 U.S. at 122.
SeeElrod, 427 U.S. at 373–74;Lehnert v.Ferris Faculty Association, 556 F. Supp. 316, 319 (W.D. Mich. 1982). Fortunately, bothWhite Cloud andBrowne were considered unpersuasive byGreenfield, 385 Mass. at 84, 431 N.E.2d at 189, andRobinson, 547 F. Supp. at 1320–21.
685 F.2d at 1069–70.
Abood, 431 U.S. at 242, n.45 (majority opinion); ibid., at 244 (J. Stevens concurring).
547 F. Supp. at 1318; seePerry v.Local Lodge 2569 of the IAM, 708 F.2d 1258, 1261–63 (7th Cir. 1983). InPerry, which was decided after the symposium at which this paper was presented, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals did not explicitly criticizeEllis but did find that a union rebate scheme, similar to that approved inEllis, “might well be described as cumbersome, unfair, and certainly not the least restrictive means of advancing governmental interests.” The court of appeals ruled that, because there apparently was no “constitutionally-permissible mode of payment,” a trial court had correctly enjoined the discharge of an employee who had stopped her agency fee payments when the union did not reduce her fee in response to her protest that it included amounts in excess of the union’s bargaining costs.
52 U.S.L.W. 3531 (No. 82-1150).
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LaJeunesse, R.J. Employees’ freedom from ideological conformity: A right without a remedy?. Journal of Labor Research 5, 265–274 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02685080
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02685080