Abstract
In recent years, the American industrial relations system has undergone considerable stress. One byproduct of a stressful period is that old ways of conducting industrial relations are being increasingly questioned. The fact that questions are raised, however, does not necessarily mean that the climate for change is receptive to all suggestions. In this paper we provide evidence that the management community would strongly oppose recent suggestions for the abandonment of long-term collective bargaining contracts.
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References
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There are, in turn, two streams within the implicit contracting literature. Some writers emphasize turnover and transactions costs. See, for example, Arthur M. Okun,Prices and Quantities: A Macroeconomic Analysis (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1981), especially chapters 2 and 3; and
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For a full discussion of these issues, see Charles R. Perry, Andrew M. Kramer, and Thomas J. Schneider,Operating During Strikes (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Industrial Research Unit, 1982): 101–109.
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Jacoby, S.M., Mitchell, D.J.B. Employer preferences for long-term union contracts. Journal of Labor Research 5, 215–228 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02685074
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02685074