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In gross terms almost 110 million tonnes of crude oil and 121 billion m3 of gas were exported to countries outside the former Soviet Union.
Cf.Petroleum Economist, January 1997, p. 34.
Since 1995 Russia has no longer transported Turkmenian natural gas to western Europe, but only to the successor states of the Soviet Union, with their much lower effective demand. Faced with debt arrears, at the start of 1997 Turkmenistan refused to export gas to the successor states. So far no agreement has been reached between Turkmenistan and Russia on the purchasing price for Turkemian gas, transit fees and the transit route.
Kazakhstan Economic Trends, Quarterly Issue (July–September), 1997, p. 128.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,Transition Report Update, April 1997, p. 57.
In some cases the figures also include deposits in Uzbekistan, which does not border on the Caspian Sea. Uzbekistan has only very limited oil reserves and known natural gas reserves of around 2 trillion m3. Cf. US Energy Information Administration, Caspian Sea Region, October 1997 (www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspian.html)
Cf.The Economist, 7 February 1998, p. 5 f; US Energy Information Administration, Caspian Sea Region, op. cit., October 1997 (www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspian.html)
Tengiz is considered to be the largest untapped oil-field in the world. Around one billion tonnes of oil are thought to be economically exploitable. Cf. M. J. Sagers, The Oil Industry in the Southern-Tier Former Soviet Republics,Post-Soviet Geography, 35/5, p. 275.
The Karachaganak field is an extension of the Russian Orenburg deposits Until now all of the natural gas produced on Kazakh territory has been exported to Orenburg.
By 2004 output of 60 million tonnes of oil and 200 billion m3 of gas is planned. Cf. M. J. Sagers, The Oil Industry in the Southern-Tier Former Soviet Republics,Post-Soviet Geography, 35/5, p. 293.
Cf. United Nations Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of Europe, No. 1, New York and Geneva 1998, p. 182.
The treaties dealt merely with fishing and shipping questions; it was also stipulated that no other countries could lay claim to rights to the Caspian Sea. No distribution of resources was undertaken, however. The USSR took as the border to Iran a line running between Astara (now in Azerbaijan) and Gasan-Kuly (now Turkmenistan), and considered that part of the Sea north of this line to be Soviet territory. Cf. concerning property question, Henn-Jüri Uibopuu: Das Kaspische Meer und das Völkerrecht, in: Recht in Ost und West, 39/7, p. 201 ff; Friedemann Müller: Die Region des Kaspischen Meeres Energiereichtum und Geopolitik, in: Osteuropa-Wirtschaft, 41/3, p. 272 f.
The 1982 Convention regulates, in addition to sovereignty over costal waters (up to 12 nautical miles), an exclusive economic zone (220-mile zone); however, the Caspian Sea is only around 200 nautical miles wide.
The spark that set off the conflict was the conclusion of a contract on the exploitation of offshore oil reserves between Azerbaijan, a western consortium and the Russian oil company Lukoil. This led to a Russian intervention, Russia arguing, with reference to the Russian-Persian treaties that no single country was able to exploit Caspian resources without general agreement with other neighbouring countries.
In October 1994 Russia officially justified its view that the Caspian Sea was a land-locked lake before the United Nations with the lack of a connection to the High Seas. As late as the end of 1996 Russia proposed extending the coastal zone from 10 to 45 miles and beyond this zone to exploit the Caspian Sea jointly.
Initially Turkmenistan lent its support to the Kazakh position, but then provisionally adopted the Russian proposal for a 45-mile coastal zone. In the wake of a contract, signed in July 1997, but annulled shortly after, by Azerbaijan and Russia on the exploitation of the Serdar field, which lies 180 km from Baku, but just 100 km from the Turkmenian coast, Turkmenistan was once again keen to take up the Kazakh proposal. Azerbaijan supports the original Kazakh proposal for a division of sea bed and waters, and has therefore not directly joined the agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan.
RFE/RL Newsline, 27 April 1997.
Turkey produces very little gas of its own and is dependent on imports. Turkish gas consumption is expected to treble or even quadruple to the year 2010, subsequently reaching between 32 and 52 billion m3 per annum. Cf.Financial Times, 31 March 1998, p. 28.
In the case of the Azerbaijan International Oil Consortium (AIOC), the USA prevented Iranian participation, as originally envisaged by Azerbaijan, and ensured that Turkey was included. Changes in the composition of the existing consortiums cannot be precluded in the future.
A case in point is the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). At its foundation in 1992 the CPC consisted merely of the states of Russia, Kazakhstan and Oman. One year later the US oil company Chevron reached an agreement with Kazakhstan on the exploitation of the Tengiz field, but did not join the consortium for the construction of the Tengiz-Novorossiisk pipeline, as it considered the stakeholding offered too small. Instead, in 1993 Chevron founded the Tengizchevroil consortium to develop the Tengiz field, although this was only granted a transport capacity for exports of 3 million tonnes per annum by Russia. Consequently the consortium began looking for transport opportunities that circumvented Russia. However, at the end of 1996 Russia, Kazakhstan and Oman reduced their stakeholdings in CPC to 50%. The remaining 50% were divided up among eight companies, including Chevron and the Russian company Rosneft.
Petroleum Economics Ltd,Long-term Oil and Energy Outlook to 2015, London, February 1998, quoted in a comparison of oil-price scenarios in: US Energy Information Administration,The World Oil Market (www.eia.doc.gov/oiaf/ieo98/oil.html), Table 14.
IEA,Oil, Gas and Coal Supply Outlook, Paris 1996, p. 63. For Kazakhstan total costs, including transport, of between US-$90 and 100 per tonne (US-$13–14 per barrel) are reported, cf.Panorama, 17 April 1998, p. 9.
They are estimated to be US-$20 per tonne of known reserves. For the transport of one billion tonnes of known reserves from the Tengiz basin (Kazakhstan), for example, total costs of US-$ 20 billion are given; for the Guneshli field in Azerbaijan investment costs of US-$ 7.8 billion are suggested for 350 to 500 million tonnes, and US-$8 billion for all the AIOC fields (around 600 million tonnes). Cf. M.J. Sagers, op. cit. The Oil Industry in the Southern-Tier Former Soviet Republics,Post-Soviet Geography, 35/5 p. 275.
The lowest value is that for the transport route 2c (Baku-Ceyhan), the maximum value for the Kazakhstan-Russia-Bulgaria-Greece pipeline (la and 3a). By way of comparison: the investment costs for a capacity of one barrel per day are (1996) around US-$ 500 in Iraq US-$ 2500 in Saudi Arabia and US-$ 5000 in Venezuela; cf. IEA, op. cit.,Oil, Gas and Coal Supply Outlook, Paris 1996 p. 62.
According to a forecast by the European Commission, GD XVII, Energy in Europe to the Year 2020, Brussels 1996.
Currently the export volume amounts to around 20 billion m3. By way of comparison, the EU imports 215 billion m3 and consumes 500 billion m3.
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Engerer, H., von Hirschhausen, C. The energy sector in the Caspian Sea Region: Disappointed hopes—Uncertain prospects. Economic Bulletin 35, 21–32 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02677360
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02677360