Summary
We introduce an allocation rule for situations defined by a TUgame, a cooperation index and a coalition structure, and characterize it axiomatically. This rule is an extension of Owen's coalitional value; in fact, a variety of previously studied game situations is shown to be embodied and unified by our model.
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Amer, R., Carreras, F. Cooperation indices and coalitional value. Top 3, 117–135 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02574806
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02574806