Abstract
To overcome deficits of the Lindahl solution concept when the economy does not exhibit constant returns to scale, Kaneko (1977a) introduced the concept of aratio equilibrium. Theratio correspondence selects for each economy its set of ratio equilibrium allocations. In this paper we provide a simple market game thatdouble implements the ratio correspondence in Nash and strong equilibria.
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Corchon, L., Wilkie, S. Double implementation of the ratio correspondence by a market mechanism. Economic Design 2, 325–337 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02499139
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02499139