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Instability in the labor market for researchers

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Abstract

R&D is both an activity which involves team effort, and with many of the features of a zero-sum game. This paper shows that these characteristics make the labor market for researchers unstable in the sense that firms have incentives to continuously change the composition of their research teams. Related results concerning the core of several cooperative games in characteristic form are also proved.

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Pérez-Castrillo, J.D. Instability in the labor market for researchers. Economic Design 2, 263–281 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02499136

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02499136

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