Public good provision and the Smith Process
An existing public good provision mechanism known as the Smith Process (SP) is extended to allow for non-zero fixed cost, non-constant marginal cost and imperfectly divisible output. Two versions of SP are considered: unrestricted (USP) and restricted with a unanimity rule (RSPU). USP implements efficient choice provided the gap between marginal and average cost is sufficiently low. RSPU relaxes the conditions for efficient implementation but increases the set of equilibria involving inefficient choice. Furthermore, if weakly dominated strategies are eliminated, then non-provision is no longer an equilibrium under RSPU but continues to be one under USP.
JEL classificationC72 D71 H41
KeywordsPublic good provision mechanisms Smith Process
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