Journal of Bioethical Inquiry

, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp 27–31 | Cite as

Selling organs and souls: Should the state prohibit ‘demeaning’ practices?

  • Dominic J C Wilkinson


It is sometimes argued that practices such as organ-selling should be prohibited because they are demeaning to the individuals involved. In this article the plausibility of such an argument is questioned. I will examine what it means to demean or be demeaned, and suggest that the mere fact that an individual is demeaning themself does not provide sufficient justification for legal prohibition. On the contrary, such laws might be argued to be demeaning.


Kant demeaning autonomy law 


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Copyright information

© Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Royal Children's HospitalMelbourneAustralia

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