Selling organs and souls: Should the state prohibit ‘demeaning’ practices?
- 391 Downloads
It is sometimes argued that practices such as organ-selling should be prohibited because they are demeaning to the individuals involved. In this article the plausibility of such an argument is questioned. I will examine what it means to demean or be demeaned, and suggest that the mere fact that an individual is demeaning themself does not provide sufficient justification for legal prohibition. On the contrary, such laws might be argued to be demeaning.
KeywordsKant demeaning autonomy law
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 2.Dodds S, Jones K. Surrogacy and the body as property. In: Darling S, editor. Cross-currents. Philosophy and the nineties. Adelaide: Flinders University Press, 1992:119–133.Google Scholar
- 7.Richards D. Sex, Drugs, Death and the law: An essay on human rights and overcriminalisation Totowa, Rowman and Littlefield, 1982.Google Scholar
- 9.Wilkinson S. Bodies for sale: ethics and exploitation in the human body trade. London: Routledge, 2003.Google Scholar
- 10.Kant, I. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans Lewis White Beck. 1959 cited in Green RM. What does it mean to use someone as ‘a means only’: rereading Kant. Kennedy Inst Ethics J 2001;11(3):247–261.Google Scholar
- 13.Feinberg J. The moral limits of the criminal law: Harm to Self. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.Google Scholar
- 14.Mill JS. On Liberty. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956, p 13Google Scholar
- 15.Kant I. On the common saying: That may be correct in theory but it is of no use in practice cited in Guyer P. Kant on Freedom, Law and Happiness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. p264Google Scholar
- 16.Wood A. Kant's ethical thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.Google Scholar