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Freedom from extinction: Conservation and development under international law

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  1. That is by way of a State agreeing by way of international treaty or national law to protect its physical environment

  2. Sovereignty, in this context, equates with independence and equality. “The rules of [international] law binding upon States… emanates from their own free will as expressed in conventions or [customary international law]… Restrictions upon the independence of Statescannot therefore be presumed.” (SS Lotus Case [1927] PCIJ Ser. A, No. 9 (emphasis added).

  3. Obviously a number of international treaties have been concluded dealing with specific ad hoc problems: The 1902 Convention for the Protection of Birds Useful to Agricultures; the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling; the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) and the 1971 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance.

  4. See generally, K. Thompson, “The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development”, in A. Grubb et al., eds.,The Earth Summit Agreements, Earthscan, 1993, 85–96.

  5. Trail Smelter Case(s) 33American Journal of International Law (1939), 182 and 35American Journal of International Law (1941) 684.

  6. Principle 1, Rio Declaration.

  7. The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 11International Legal Materials [1972] 1416, hereafter the “Stockholm Declaration”.

  8. Preamble.

  9. Principle 1, Stockholm Declaration.

  10. Minors Oposa et al. v.Secretary of the Environment, [1994] 33 173; for comment on the case see, A. La Vina, “The Right to a Sound Environment in the Phillippines: The Significance of the Minors Oposa Case”, 3Review of European Community and International Environmental Law (1994), 246–252.

  11. See generally, A. Aguilar and N. Popovic, “Law Making in the United Nations: The UN Study on Human Rights and the Environment”, 3Review of European Community and International Environmental Law (1994), 197–205.

  12. For example. EC Directive 90/313 on Freedom to information on the Environment.

  13. For example. the European Convention on Human Rights [1950], see generally R. Desgangne, “Integrating Environmental Values into the European Convention on Human Rights”, 89American Journal of International Law (1995), 263–294 (hereafter Desgangne).

  14. Article 2 — which could of course be threatened by extreme forms of environmental degradation: Desgangne,supra n. 13, “Integrating Environmental Values into the European Convention on Human Rights”, 89American Journal of International Law (1995), at 266–269.

  15. Article 3, inLopez Ostra v.Spain [1993] App. No. 16798/90 (unpublished). See Desgangne,supra n.13, “Integrating Environmental Values into the European Convention on Human Rights”, 89American Journal of International Law (1995), at 270–71, where the European Commission on Human Rights admitted a claim under Article 3 for damage resulting from the activities of a nearby water purification and waste treatment plant.

  16. Article 8. This Article has been used by individuals complaining about aircraft noise:Arrondelle v.UK [1980] 23Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights [1980], 166; and in the building of a nuclear plant across the river at the back of a house:S. v.France [1990] (in Desgange,supra n.13, “Integrating Environmental Values into the European Convention on Human Rights”, 89American Journal of International Law (1995), at 27), again on the basis of noise pollution, although the application did allege loss of aesthetic amenity. See Desgangne,supra n.13, “Integrating Environmental Values into the European Convention on Human Rights”, 89American Journal of International Law (1995), at 271–277.

  17. The right to private life has been used by the Lapp minority in Norway who successfully complained to the commission that the right as a group to private life under Article 8 had been violated by the building of a Hydroelectric plant which would have submerged a valley in which they lived (G and E v.Norway [1984] App. Nos. 9278/81 and 9415/81, 35 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 30, in Desgangne,supra n.13, “Integrating Environmental Values into the European Convention on Human Rights”, 89American Journal of International Law (1995), at 274). Further, the Lubicon lake band of Canadian Indians successfully alleged in a complaint to the UN Human Rights Committee that historical and more recent economic developments (notably oil and gas exploration) threatened the group's traditional way of life and right to determine themselves how such resources were to be disposed of (or not), thus violating their right to self determination (Article 1, ICCPR) and their minority rights (Article 27). See Communication No. 167/1984, UN Doc. CCPR/C/38/D/1667/1984 (March 1990); and also see Aguilar and Popovic,supra n.11, “Law Making in the United Nations: The UN Study on Human Rights and the Environment”, 3Review of European Community and International Environmental Law (1994), at 197, 199.

  18. See in particular Principle 22, Rio Declaration.

  19. Minors Oposa et al v.Secretary of the Environment, [1994] 33International Legal Materials 173; for comment on the case see, La Vine,supra n.10, “The Right to a Sound Environment in the Phillippines: The Significance of the Minors Oposa Case”, 3Review of European Community and International Environmental Law (1994), 246–252.

  20. See generally, P. Birnie and A. Boyle,International Law and the Environment, Oxford University Press, 1992, 211–12.

  21. Statement by The World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future [1987].

  22. Principle 4 of the Stockholm Declaration [1972].

  23. Principle 2.

  24. Principle 4, Rio Declaration [1992].

  25. The Rio Declaration recognised that conservation measures appropriate in developed states may not be appropriate in developing states, recognising states' “Differing Responsibilities” (Principle 15).

  26. Rio Declaration, Principle 15.

  27. Rio Declaration, Principle 17.

  28. See generally, A. Munson, “The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity”, in Grubb,supra n.4,The Earth Summit Agreements, Earthscan, 1993, at 75–84.

  29. Although the Convention recognises differing obligations “in accordance with their particular conditions” (Article 6). This may not be read as allowing the extinction of a species.

  30. Article 8.

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  1. University of Central Lancashire, Lancashire, UK

    Steven Wheatley (Lecturer in Law)

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  1. Steven Wheatley
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Wheatley, S. Freedom from extinction: Conservation and development under international law. Liverpool Law Rev 17, 215–221 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02439526

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