References
Andreoni J (1988) Why free ride? Strategies and learning in public goods experiments. Journal of Public Economics 37: 291–304
Downs A (1957) An economic theory of democracy, Harper and Row, New York
Isaac RM, Walker JM (1988) Group size effects in public good provision: The voluntary contributions mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 53: 179–199
Isaac RM, Walker JM, Thomas SH (1984) Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations. Public Choice 43: 113–149
Morton RB (1991) Groups in rational turnout models. American Journal of Political Science 35: 758–776
Palfrey TR, Rosenthal H (1983) A strategic calculus of voting. Public Choice 41: 7–53
Palfrey TR, Rosenthal H (1988) Private incentives in social dilemmas. The Effects of Incomplete Information and Altruism: Journal of Public Economics 35: 309–332
Schram AJHC, Sonnemans J (1996) Why people vote: experimental evidence. Forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Psychology.
Schram AJHC, van Winden FAAM (1991) Why people vote: Free riding and the production and consumption of social pressure. Journal of Economic Psychology 12: 575–620
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
Financial support by the Netherlands' Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) is gratefully acknowledged. We would like to thank Jeff Banks, Eric van Damme, Werner Güth, Claudia Keser, Theo Offerman, Mark Olson, Jörgen Wit, and two anonymous referees for useful comments, and Otto Perdeck for computational assistance.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Schram, A., Sonnemans, J. Voter turnout as a participation game: An experimental investigation. Int J Game Theory 25, 385–406 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02425263
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02425263