International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 25, Issue 3, pp 355–383 | Cite as

An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections

  • Robert Forsythe
  • Thomas Rietz
  • Roger Myerson
  • Robert Weber
Article

Abstract

We report the results of elections conducted in a laboratory setting, modelled on a threecandidate example due to Borda. By paying subjects conditionally on election outcomes, we create electorates with (publicly) known preferences. We compare the results of experiments with and without non-binding pre-election polls under plurality rule, approval voting, and Borda rule. We also refer to a theory of voting “equilibria,” which makes sharp predictions concerning individual voter behavior and election outcomes. We find that Condorcet losers occasionally win regardless of the voting rule or presence of polls. Duverger's law (which asserts the predominance of two candidates) appears to hold under plurality rule, but close three-way races often arise under approval voting and Borda rule. Voters appear to poll and vote strategically. In elections, voters usually cast votes that are consistent with some strategic equilibrium. By the end of an election series, most votes are consistent with a single equilibrium, although that equilibrium varies by experimental group and voting rule.

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Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert Forsythe
    • 1
  • Thomas Rietz
    • 1
  • Roger Myerson
    • 2
  • Robert Weber
    • 2
  1. 1.College of Business AdministrationUniversity of IowaIowa CityUSA
  2. 2.Kellogg Graduate School of ManagementNorthwestern UniversityIllinoisEvanstonUSA

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