Abstract
During the 1980s a fairly active market developed in the private placement of limited recourse project financing. Although this form of financing is gaining in importance, we know very little about it. This article presents a theoretical analysis of project financing. In the model of the firm presented, outstanding risky debt gives rise to agency costs of underinvestment that are offset by the benefit of debt-related tax shields. The tradeoff specifies the optimal leverage for a firm. Within this framework, we consider the optimality of financing a new project with a nonrecourse project financing arrangement. We derive implications for 1) the characteristics of a new venture that will be project financed, 2) the wealth gains from project financing over that of financing with straight debt, and 3) the optimal allocation of debt across the different assets (the sponsor firm vs. the new venture). It is shown that a project financing arrangement, where the debt is optimally allocated to the sponsor firm and the new venture, increases value by reducing agency costs and increasing the value of tax shields (compared to the case of straight debt financing). The optimal allocation of debt in project financing involves assigning to the sponsor firm and the new venture debt levels equal to their individual optimal capital structures. Several testable empirical implications in finance and accounting are developed.
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John, T.A., John, K. Optimality of project financing: Theory and empirical implications in finance and accounting. Rev Quant Finan Acc 1, 51–74 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02408406
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02408406