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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. George Mason University, Virginia

    Ronald Heiner

  2. University of Oregon, Oregon

    William C. Mitchell

  3. Center for European Studies, Harvard University, Massachusetts

    Michael Dreyer

  4. Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm, Sweden

    Karl Wärneryd

  5. CATO Institute, Washington, DC

    William N. Niskanen (Chairman)

  6. University of Michigan-Dearborn, Michigan

    Brooks B. Hull

Authors
  1. Ronald Heiner
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  2. William C. Mitchell
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  3. Michael Dreyer
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  4. Karl Wärneryd
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  5. William N. Niskanen
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  6. Brooks B. Hull
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Heiner, R., Mitchell, W.C., Dreyer, M. et al. Reviews. Constit Polit Econ 3, 113–128 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393235

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393235

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