Constitutional Political Economy

, Volume 3, Issue 1, pp 89–112 | Cite as

Constitutional renegotiation: Impediments to consensual revision

  • Charlotte Twight
Article

Abstract

In a post-constitutional context, restructuring of constitutional rights often fundamentally alters the role and scope of government. It is therefore important to assess the extent to which consensuality is likely to characterize the process of constitutional revision. This article provides theoretical and empirical grounds for concluding that nonconsensual constitutional revision is often the rule rather than the exception. The endogeneity of politically relevant transaction costs and their manipulation by self-interested political actors in a post-constitutional environment are central to the analysis.

Keywords

Economic Theory Transaction Cost Political Actor Empirical Ground Constitutional Revision 

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Copyright information

© George Mason University 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • Charlotte Twight
    • 1
  1. 1.Boise State UniversityBoise

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