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Crafting social rules: Common law vs. statute law, once again

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Abstract

While a considerable literature has arisen seeking to compare the economic efficiency of common law and statute law processes, some scholars have argued that these efforts are misplaced because what should be assessed is not efficiency but stability of expectations. This paper argues that any generic comparison of common law and statute law must be inconclusive, because there is no such thing asthe common law or statute law process. Rather, there are many particular processes, and any claim based on a comparison of generic alternatives will falter because it will fail to reflect essential institutional detail.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. George Mason University, 22030-4444, Fairfax, VA, USA

    Richard E. Wagner (Professor)

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  1. Richard E. Wagner
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Additional information

I am grateful to Charles K. Rowley and Viktor J. Vanberg for valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper, and to the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation for its continuing support of my scholarly efforts. I am also grateful to Robert J. Staaf for advice and encouragement on many occasions over the years, traces of which, I am confident, are evident here.

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Wagner, R.E. Crafting social rules: Common law vs. statute law, once again. Constit Polit Econ 3, 381–397 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393142

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