Abstract
Constitutional economics may be defined as the study of constraints chosen by cooperative groups. In this paper, the scope of constitutional economics is extended by an examination of the constitutions and rules that govern seven of the eight largest U.S. Christian denominations. This examination of church constitutions reveals constitutional provisions and church rules that protect denominational reputation by preserving doctrinal integrity and constraining the behavior of local churches, clergy, and individual members. By protecting their reputations, religious denominations may increase their appeal to current or prospective members or both.
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Lipford, J. Organizational reputation and constitutional constraints: An application to religious denominations. Constit Polit Econ 3, 343–357 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393140
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393140