Constitutional Political Economy

, Volume 1, Issue 2, pp 169–196 | Cite as

James M. Buchanan: Economist cum contractarian

  • Dennis C. Mueller


Economic Theory 
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Copyright information

© George Mason University 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dennis C. Mueller
    • 1
  1. 1.University of MarylandCollege Park

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