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Earlier versions of this paper have been the topic of colloquia at the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meeting, philosophy of logic section; Dartmouth College, Rutgers University, and the Philosophy of Language Conference, SUC/Buffalo. I am grateful to Professofs Lee Bowie, Robert Fogelin, Jaakko Hintikka, Ruth Marcus, J.J.C. Smart, Fred Sommers, Nathan Stemmer, Gerold Stahl, and Scott Weinstein for their comments.
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Croddy, W.S. Reparsing and essentialism. Philosophia 17, 1–12 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02389999
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02389999