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The implications of error for Davidsonian charity

  • Philosophia Series: On “Error”
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References

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  • —. (1986) “Judging Interpersonal Interests.” In Jon Elster and Aunund Hylland (eds),Foundations of Social Choice Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Pr.

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  • Tarski, Alfred. (1983) “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages.” InLogic, Semantics, Metamathematics. 2nd ed. Indianapolis: Hackett.

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I am grateful to J. Bennett, J. Bricke, A.C. Genova, and C. Mickett for comments on an earlier version of this paper.

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Larson, D. The implications of error for Davidsonian charity. Philosophia 20, 311–320 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02382098

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02382098

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