, Volume 26, Issue 1–2, pp 65–77 | Cite as

Could demonstratives be descriptions?

  • Steven Rieber
Series: Emotion


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Copyright information

© Philosophia 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Steven Rieber
    • 1
  1. 1.State UniversityGeorgiaAtlantaUSA

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