Skip to main content
Log in

Irrealism and error in ethics

  • Series: On “Error”
  • Published:
Philosophia Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

References

  • Blackburn, Simon 1980. “Truth, Realism and the Regulation of Moral Theory.”Midwest Studies in Philosophy. 5. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • — 1981. “Rule Following and Moral Realism.” In Wittgenstein:To Follow A Rule, ed. by Steven, Holtzman and Christopher M. Leitch. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  • — 1984.Spreading the Word. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brink, David, O. 1989.Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boyd, Richard. 1988. “How to be a Moral Realist”. InEssays on Moral Realism, ed. by Geoffrey Sayre-McCord. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carson, Thomas. 1984.The Status of Morality Dordrecht D. Reidel.

    Google Scholar 

  • Copp, David. 1991. “Moral Realism: Facts and Norms.”Ethics 101: 610–24.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Devitt, Michael. 1981.Designation. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • —. 1984. Realism and Truth. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dummett, Michael. 1975. “What is a Theory of Meaning?” InMind and Language., ed. by S. Guttenplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • —. 1976. “What is a Theory of Meaning (II)?” InEssays in Semantics, ed. by G. Evans and J. McDowell. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Field, Hartry. 1972. “Tarski's Theory of Truth.”Journal of Philosophy 69: 347–75.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gibbard, Allan 1990.Wise Choices Apt Feelings. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gilligan, Carol. 1982.In a Different Voice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • —. 1988. “Remapping the Moral Domain: New Images of Self in Relationship.” InMapping the Moral Domain, ed. by C. Gilligan, J. V. Ward, J. M. Taylor, and B. Bardige, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Horgan, Terence. 1986a. “Psychologism, Semantics and Ontology.”Nous 20:21–31.

    Google Scholar 

  • —. 1986b. “Truth and Ontology”.Philosophical Papers 15: 1–21.

    Google Scholar 

  • — 1987. “Psychologistic Semantics and Moral Truth.”Philosophical Studies 52: 357–70.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • — 1990. “Psychologistic Semantics, Robust Vagueness and the Philosophy of Language.” InMeanings and Prototypes: Studies in Linguistic Categorization, ed. by S. L. Tsohatzidis. Cambridge: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  • — 1991. “Metaphysical Realism and Psychologistic Semantics.”Erkenntnis 34: 297–322.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Horgan, T. and Timmons, M. 1991. “New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth.”Journal of Philosophical Research. Special volume as part of the proceedings of the Mark Overvold Memorial Conference, “Morality, Rationality, and Self-Interest,” ed. by Robert Audi. In press.

  • Horgan, T. and Timmons, M. 1992a. “Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness Revived.”Synthese 92. In press.

  • Horgan, T. and Timmons, M. 1992b. “Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: The ‘Open Question Argument’ Revived.”Philosophical Papers. Forthcoming.

  • Hume, David. 1777.An Enquiry Concerning Human Nature. InHume's Enquiries, 3rd edition, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuhn, Thomas. 1974. “Second Thoughts on Paradigms.” In Thomas Kuhn,The Essential Tension. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laudan, Larry. 1984.Science and Values. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mackie, J. L. 1977.Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. New York: Penguin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moore, G. E. 1912.Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, Hilary 1983.Realism and Reason Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • — 1991. “Comments and Replies.”Erkenntnis 34: 63–71.

    Google Scholar 

  • Railton, Peter. 1984. “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality” InConsequentialism and its Critics, ed. by S. Scheffler. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ross, W. D. 1930.The Right and the Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Singer, M. G. 1988. “The Ideal of a Rational Morality.”Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60: 15–38.

    Google Scholar 

  • Slote, Michael. 1985.Common-Sense Morality and Consequentialism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stevenon, C. L. 1966. “Ethical Fallibility.” InEthics and Society, ed. by Richard T. DeGeorge. Garden City, N.Y.. Doubleday & Company, Inc.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stich, Stephen. 1990.The Fragmentation of Reason. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sturgeon, Nicholas. 1986. “What Difference Does it Make Whether Moral Realism is True?”Southern Journal of Philosophy XXIV: 115–141. Supplementary volume of the proceedings of the Spindel Conference on “Moral Realism,” ed. by N. Gillespie.

    Google Scholar 

  • Throop, William. 1989. “Relativism and Error: Putnam's Lessons for the Relativist”Philosophy of Phenomenological Research XLIX: 675–86.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tienson, John. 1989. A Conception of Metaphysics.American Philosophical Quarterly 26: 63–71.

    Google Scholar 

  • Timmons, Mark. 1990. “On the Epistemic Status of Considered Moral Judgments”Southern Journal of Philosophy XXIX: 97–129. Supplementary volume of the proceedings of the Spindel Conference on “Moral Epistemology,” ed. by M. Timmons.

    Google Scholar 

  • —. 1991. “Putnam's Moral Objectivism.”Erkenntnis 34: 371–399.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Timmons, Mark. Forthcoming a. “A Version of Ethical Contextualism.” InMoral Knowledge, ed. by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons.

  • Timmons, Mark. Forthcoming b. Morality Without Foundations. (manuscript in progress).

  • Warnock, G. J. 1971.The Object of Morality, London: Methuen & Co.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wong, David. 1984Moral Relativity. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Timmons, M. Irrealism and error in ethics. Philosophia 22, 373–406 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02379654

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02379654

Navigation