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Translated from Kibernetika i Sistemnyi Analiz, No. 1, pp. 152–170, January–February, 1996.
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Shibaev, S.V. Some informal scenarios of player behavior and equilibrium computation processes in games under incomplete information. Cybern Syst Anal 32, 125–140 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02366590
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02366590